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Resorting to External
Norms and Principles in Constitutional
Decision-Making
BY ALVIN L. GOLDMAN*

INTRODUCTION

iven the very significant role of constitutional law in the American
political system and the fact that Supreme Court Justices are
appointed through a political process, it is understandable that the
appropriate judicial approach to resolving constitutional issues often is the
subject of political commentary. Unfortunately, discourse by politicians
concerning this issue seldom rises to the deserved level of wisdom. One of
President George W. Bush's public mantras is illustrative of political
commentary respecting federal judicial appointments: "I'm going to put
strict constructionists on the bench."' On its face, and as understood by
politically naive audiences, the statement appears to mean that the
appointed Supreme Court Justice will interpret the Constitution so as to
enforce what is stated in the charter's text; that is, the Justice will resolve
all constitutional issues by applying a "plain meaning" rule. This doubtless
sounds reasonable to those who are unfamiliar with constitutional decisionmaking. Any serious student of that process should recognize, however,
that this is a ludicrous promise.2
G

* William T. Lafferty Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. The substance
of much of this article was prepared as the U.S. national report for a session of the
World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Santiago,

Chile, January 15, 2004, which examined the use of "unwritten norms and

principles" in constitutional decision-making. The author appreciates corrections
made to this article by the student editors and acknowledges an important
correction called to his attention by Professor Stephen Vasek.
'Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Vows to Seek Conservative Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2002, at A24.
2 For politically sophisticated audiences, the statement carries a less literal
meaning. The more accurate understanding of it takes account of political norms
and principles. Audiences who understand the applicable political nuance realize
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I. ELUSIVENESS OF THE CONSTITUTION'S "PLAIN MEANING"

Careful reading of the text of the U.S. Constitution quickly reveals that
much of it lacks clear meaning. Although the text is the essential starting
point, divining the Constitution's meaning requires much more than a
dictionary of American vocabulary and a treatise on American grammar
and usage; sound interpretation frequently necessitates finding guidance
from other sources.
In order to appreciate why the written text is but the starting point in
understanding the Constitution it helps to keep in mind some basic
characteristics of the charter, as well as the manner and context in which
it was adopted. First, the original Constitution was written in 1787, and a
majority of the amendments were adopted in the succeeding one hundred
years. The vocabulary of the English language is neither fixed nor rigidly
regulated.3 Words and phrases can have multiple meanings, and these can
change with time. In addition, general linguistic usage in the United States
was not clearly established in the late eighteenth century, when the original
Constitution was adopted, and American etymology was not well-tracked
during the period when most of the constitutional text was prepared.4

the phrase "strict constructionist" is a code declaring that the jurist will favor the
judicial agenda of the President's conservative supporters by limiting the
protections afforded persons investigated for or accused of crimes, rejecting the
constitutionality of affirmative action remedies in civil rights cases, upholding laws
that prohibit abortions, and lowering the barriers to government assistance to and
participation in mainstream religious institutions and practices.
As early as 1780, John Adams, later the nation's second President, and others
unsuccessfully urged Congress to establish an institute for "refining, correcting,
improving and ascertaining the English language." JONATHON GREEN, CHASING
THE SUN: DICTIONARY MAKERS AND THE DICTIONARIES THEY MADE 305 (1996).
4 The first English language dictionaries were tools for English-Latin and
English-French translation and had only brief definitions. The earliest dictionaries
devoted solely to the English language were published primarily as guides to
spelling and pronunciation, not meaning, and covered only a small portion of the
English vocabulary. Samuel Johnson's Dictionary,published in 1755, set out to
establish fixed meanings for listed words, a task he later acknowledged was futile.
SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 50
(1984). His dictionary was not imported into the United States until 1818, but some
private American libraries no doubt had copies purchased in England. GREEN,
supra note 3, at 285. Noah Webster's American Dictionary of the English
Language, first published in 1828, included multiple meanings. LANDAU, supra,
at 60. These often, however, reflected Webster's personal religious, social, and
political prejudices. Id.; GREEN, supra note 3, at 318, 324-25.
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A. HistoricalEvolution of Meanings
The meaning attached to words, and to legal terms, can change with the
context in which they are used. For example, the Constitution provides for
the impeachment of civil officers for "Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors." ' In his dictionary of 1755, Samuel Johnson
defined "misdemeanor" as "Offence; ill behaviour; something less than an
atrocious crime."6 Noah Webster's dictionary of 1828 provides this
definition: "Ill behaviour; evil conduct; fault; mismanagement: In law, an
offense of a less atrocious nature than a crime." 7 A modem dictionary, on
the other hand, reports that the archaic meaning was merely "misdeed," but
that the contemporary meaning of misdemeanor is "a crime less serious
than a felony."8 Nevertheless, when the word "misdemeanor" is added into
the phrase used in the Constitution, its meaning takes on different shading
based on the history of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century impeachment
trials in the British Parliament, where impeachment was thought to be
justified only by a serious abuse of a public trust.9
Even if judges had not construed "misdemeanor" as having separate
meanings in common usage and when used to describe offenses warranting
impeachment, each definition of the word ascribed by early dictionary
writers nonetheless suffers from vagueness."0 Unsurprisingly, therefore,
scholars disagree regarding the proper application of the phrase to
particular events. 1
B. The Absence of UnitaryIntent
Another reason the text of the Constitution is not self-explanatory is
that the promulgators reached many compromises in choosing the docu-

'U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
6 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (photo.

reprint 1987) (1755).
7 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(photo. reprint 1970) (1828).
8

WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 541 (1971).

9 See THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton); 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 268-70 (1833).
to See supra notes 6-7.
" For a history of impeachments for "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," as well
as a survey of interpretations of the phrase, see 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 169-202 (3d ed. 2000).
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wording. 12 Partly

ment's
for that reason, they often were content with broad
statements rather than detailed provisions. They realized that the more the
document said, the more difficulties would be encountered in winning
popular support for its ratification by a geographically, religiously,
politically, economically, and culturally diverse populace.13 Therefore, in
order to reduce the prospect of offending those whose support was needed,
the drafters often selected general, vague terms and used language
sparingly. As one observer explains: "Precise and vague at one and the
same time, the words of the Constitution were ... the visible signs of a
painful process of bargaining among proud, committed, and yet not
unbending men."' 4
The drafters' cautious effort to avoid saying too much is evident in the
very conciseness of the document. Excluding provisions superseded by
amendments, the entire Constitution, including amendments and headings,
has only 6800 words.' 5 Nevertheless, with such little verbiage, the
Constitution defines the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the
federal government, describing their powers and the limitations thereof.
The Constitution also sets forth the manner in which governing officials are
selected or elected; the fundamental procedures by which the branches are
to conduct their business; the branches' interrelationships and interactions
with the constituent states; the manner in which officials can be removed
from office; limitations on the authority of state officials; and various
fundamental rights and liberties of individuals residing in, and entities
conducting business in, the United States. Perhaps the brevity of the
Constitution can be better appreciated by comparing it with a not overly
detailed federal law, the Administrative Procedures Act, which uses more
than twice as many words to regulate the right of persons to access
information held by federal agencies and to attend meetings where agencies
16
and their staffs decide official business.
12CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OFTHE CONSTITUTION

(photo. reprint 1967) (1937);

136, 146-51,733-35

ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-

TION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 91-105 (6th ed. 1983).
'3 WARREN, supra note 12, at 701-02, 737.
14CLINTON ROSsITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 260

(1966).
5 This word count includes the twenty-six words of the Twenty-seventh
Amendment, whose status as a proper part of the Constitution may be in doubt
because its ratification spanned a period of over two hundred years. See generally
Richard B. Bernstein, The SleeperAwakes: The Historyand Legacy of the TwentySeventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (1992) (describing controversies
surrounding the amendment's validity). The amendments, moreover, are typically
more verbose than the provisions they replaced.
16 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552a, 552b (2003). The three statutes contain 15,012 total
words.
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It can be argued that, since the Constitution is a compact, provisions
that are vague or unclear should be interpreted to carry out the intentions
of those who devised and adopted it. Accordingly, courts should give
weight to only those external sources that clearly reveal the original intent.
For many important provisions of the Constitution, however, there is little
concrete evidence respecting those intentions. A few participants kept notes
purporting to report what was said in debates at the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, but these notes were incomplete, were not always in
agreement, and were not officially approved by the Constitutional
Convention. 7 Also, even though much of the wording of the final draft,
prepared by a small committee, differed significantly from the resolutions
adopted by the full Convention after several months of debate and votes,
the nuances of those differences were not fully discussed in the days prior
18
to adoption.
In addition, the understandings of the drafters were only the first step
in reaching agreement to reconstitute the system of government for the
United States of America. The new charter had to be approved in separate
ratification conventions held in each state. Over the course of many
months, objections to numerous provisions of the proposed Constitution
were publicly discussed and variously interpreted by debaters in the states.
There is some documentation regarding those debates, but this record, too,
is far from complete. 9 (The same was true of key amendments to the
Constitution, especially the earliest ones.) Further, although some state
conventions recorded their reservations regarding particular provisions and
the absence of others, those reservations were not incorporated into the
Constitution.2" This may have been because the structure of the ratification
procedure "forced an 'all-or-nothing' vote on the proposed Constitution,
and 'nothing' risked dissolution of the Union (as the states might have
proved unwilling to continue living under the Articles of Confederation

" The earliest publication of such notes was in 1819. The most comprehensive,
those of James Madison, were not published until 1840.
at 127.
IS

WARREN,

supra note 12,

WILLIAM P. MURPHY, THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM 148-49 (1967).

Compare the resolutions adopted by the Convention between June 20 and July 26,
1787, with the August 6 draft of the Plan by the Committee of Detail and the
Committee of Style and Revision's final draft of September 12. See WARREN,
supra note 12, at 686.
'9MURPHY, supra note 18, at 422.
2)For a discussion of these reservations and of the amendments states proposed
in their ratification conventions, see id. at 309-99.
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while the proposed Constitution was being rewritten). '21 As a result, it is
doubtful "that constitutional interpreters can ever divine the Ratifiers'
intended meaning, as they never had a chance to express their specific
intent. 22
Justice Jackson once aptly summarized the problem:
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they
foreseen modem conditions, must be divined from materials almost as
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.
A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields
no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected
23
sources on each side of any question. They largely cancel each other.
C. Debates Surrounding the Second Amendment
The difficulties of relying solely on either the words or historical
evidence to discover the "true" meaning of the Constitution can be
illustrated by current debates respecting the Second Amendment, which
states: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
The very use of the word "arms" in this amendment demonstrates the
potential difficulties in construing the English language since the word's
most common meaning describes the upper limbs of the human body. In
this context, however, those who adopted the amendment unquestionably
understood it to refer to weapons or, more specifically, weapons of the sort
wielded by a single individual in the late eighteenth century.
Some commentators, emphasizing the reference to "the people" in
second part of the sentence that constitutes the Second Amendment, argue
that this language prohibits the federal government 24 from imposing any
restraints or regulations on private ownership or on the use of deadly
21Alex

Kozinski & Harry Susman, Book Review, OriginalMean[der]ings,49
STAN. L. REv. 1583, 1584 (1997) (book review).
22
Id.
23 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
24 The amendment formed part of the Bill of Rights, which was generally
understood to address the relationship of the federal government to the people.
Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See
also JOHN E. NOWAK &RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 368 (6th ed.
2000).
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weapons of any sort. 25 The advocates of this approach assert that the term
"the people" in the second clause of the sentence identifies an individual
right distinguishable from the state's collective interest in its militia,
described in the first clause.26 A variation of this "individual right"
interpretation argues that, considering both the attention to the security of
one's home reflected in the Third and Fourth Amendments, and the
reported British tradition of treating possession of arms as a symbol of
individual freedom, textual and historical evidence supports an intention to
bar the federal government from depriving people of the right to own
weapons of the sort commonly used to defend oneself or one's household
27
or local community.
Others point out that the phrase "the people" does not have a single,
consistent, narrow meaning in the Constitution or its amendments. 2 This
is apparent in the Preamble, where the phrase "the people" is used not with
reference to individual action, but instead in the composite sense of a

communal action of entering into a social compact-a meaning more
appropriate to the context of the Second Amendment's adoption. 29 Thus, it

25

See Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and BearArms Conditionedon

Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript at 8-16, http://ssm.com/abstract=42098 1) (arguing that contemporaneous state constitutions providing an individual right to bear arms suggest that
ratifying states understood the Second Amendment to extend this right).
26 See id. (manuscript at 12-13).
27 Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of SelfProtection,in THE GREAT AMERICAN GuN DEBATE 271, 288 (Don B. Kates, Jr. &
Gary Kleck eds., 1997) [hereinafter Kates, Self-Protection]:"In the absence of a
police, the American legal tradition was for responsible, law-abiding citizens to be
armed and see to their own defense and for most military age males to chase down
criminals in response to the hue and cry and to perform the more formal police
duties associated with their membership in theposse comitatus and the militia." See
generally id. at 278-79. See also Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Protectionand the
OriginalMeaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 259 (1983)
[hereinafter Kates, Original Meaning]. If, as Kates argues, the qualification
"responsible, law-abiding citizens" was understood to be incorporated into the
meaning of the term "the right to keep and bear arms," then the government had
inherent power to prohibit arms possession by non-citizens, or by irresponsible or
non-law-abiding citizens.
28
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE
L.J. 1131, 1163 (1991) (noting that, while many scholars consider allusions to "the
people" in the Bill of Rights to confer individual rights, the term also "conjure[s]
up the Constitution's bedrock principle of popular sovereignty").
29 Id.
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is argued, when the Second Amendment is read as a whole, and in light of
ratification debates reflecting concerns that Congress' constitutional
authority to organize and discipline the militia3" could permit it to eliminate
or minimize state militias, the second part of the sentence provides the
means for carrying out the purpose stated in the first part.3 ' From this
perspective, the Second Amendment merely guarantees a state's authority
to establish and maintain local defensive units (the militia) by assuring that
federal law will not disarm militia members.3 2 According to this interpretation, the amendment grants the right to each state, not to individual citizens.
A variation of this interpretive approach contends that the amendment
merely prohibits the federal government from barring individuals eligible
for militia service from owning and possessing weapons they will need
should they be called to service.33 Still another reading is that even if the
30 See U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 16.

3"Amar, supra note 28, at 1165. Others argue that the word "people" in the
Second Amendment is used to designate a person's individual right in the same
manner as when the term "people" is used in the First, Fourth, and Ninth
Amendments. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace SecondAmendment, 73 N.Y.U.

L. REV. 793, 810 (1998). However, this characterization of those other provisions
is not self-evident. Although "people" is used in the First Amendment in referring
to the right to assemble, assembly requires more than a single person and therefore
is a collective, not an individual, right. See Amar, supra note 28, at 1152-53. The
Fourth Amendment refers to the right of the "people" to be secure in their homes,
thus protecting both the individual and the collective household. Id. at 1175-77
(noting, however, that the collective reading of "people" in this amendment may
be strained). The Ninth Amendment states that the "people" retain rights that the
Constitution does not expressly grant the government. That ambiguous provision
can be construed to encompass communal rights, such as freedom of association
or the principle of majority rule in voting or in decisions by multi-member
governing institutions. Id. at 1200. It can also refer to individual rights, such as
personal autonomy. See infra note 146.
Amar, supra note 28, at 1165. ContraVolokh, supra note 31, at 801-04.
3 See Robert Weisberg, Values, Violence, and the Second Amendment:
American Character,Constitutionalism,and Crime, 39 Hous. L. REV. 1, 2 & n.3
32

(2002) (citing United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 221-27 (5th Cir. 2001));
1 TRIBE, supra note 11, at 899 (noting that many conclude the Second Amendment
does not protect hunting and self-defense). The argument is also made that if a state
does not have a militia, the Second Amendment is of no effect and today, in fact,
the militias no longer exist. H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE
MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS 228 (2002); David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The TerriyingSecondAmendment, 101 YALE L.J.
551, 615 (1991). Congress enticed the states to eliminate their militias by providing
substantial financial assistance for the establishment of a state National Guard.
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language prohibits federal regulation of individual ownership and
possession of "arms," the protection is limited to weapons equivalent to the
personal armaments used by militias in 1791 when the amendment was
adopted. The weaponry of the day, of course, included swords, daggers,
pikes, hatchets, and single-shot pistols, rifles, and what today would be
shotguns. In United States v. Miller, the Court held that a sawed-off
shotgun, a weapon not used for hunting, was not protected by the Second
Amendment.34
Since there is no compelling logic that clearly merits selecting any one
of the above interpretations,35 some advocates of these various approaches
have attempted to bolster their positions by turning to historical evidence.
These scholars have cited accounts concerning the degree to which militias
in fact were organized at the time of the Second Amendment's adoption,
the militias' actual dependence upon members' providing their own
weapons, the extent to which people owned various types of weapons at
that time, the use of privately owned weapons in committing crimes, and
contemporaneous public attitudes toward firearm ownership.36 It is
inevitable that such research into ancient facts will confront an array of
difficulties. 37 Therefore, it is no surprise that there is a lack of consensus

UVILLER & MERKEL, supra,at 134. Each state thereafter created its state National
Guard and in so doing agreed to abide by federal regulations and oversight in the
Guard's organizational structure, recruitment policies, pay schedules, disciplinary
regulations, training programs, and the like. Id. at 228. On the other hand, Professor
Barnett argues that a federal law, 10 U.S.C. § 311, continues to recognize the
existence of the militia. Barnett, supra note 25 (manuscript at 37-38). Barnett,
however, incorrectly discounts the fact that the cited statute created a federal
militia; it did not continue state militias. See id. at 38. Since the "militia" referred
to in the Second Amendment undoubtedly is the state militia, the cited federal
statute has no affect on whatever right is or is not preserved by the amendment.
Thus, if Second Amendment rights are dependent on the existence of a state militia,
currently
those constitutional rights are in a state of suspension.
34
Volokh, supra note 31, at 811 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,
178 (1939)); Kates, OriginalMeaning, supra note 27, at 249-50.
" One author observed that from 1970 to 1989, scholarly articles on the subject
were almost evenly divided between those that supported and those that rejected
the individual right interpretation. Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of
Second Amendment Scholarship:A Primer,76 CHi.-KENT. L. REv. 3, 8-g (2000).
36 See, e.g., Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 27, at 276 (arguing that in the
colonial era, those who used personal weapons to thwart crime were viewed as
virtuous citizens).
37 For example, inconsistent data have been presented by scholars who
examined probate documents of the time in an effort to identify the portion of the
population that actually owned guns. For a variety of reasons, however, those data
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regarding the relevant demographics and practices when the Second
Amendment was adopted.3 8
More importantly, determination of the precise factual setting in which
a constitutional provision was drafted does not necessarily provide reliable
guidance respecting the norm or principle intended to be conveyed by the
wording of that provision. The goal of a constitutional provision, whether
in the original or amended text, can be either to preserve a valued rule or
arrangement or to modify an existing rule or arrangement. The Constitution
and its Bill of Rights undoubtedly were intended to do some of both. Thus,
ascertaining the principles or practices that existed at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution or the Second Amendment does not reveal
whether the goal was preservation or change.
The foregoing demonstrates that some provisions of the Constitution
lack a clear meaning because many of the words and phrases did not have
fixed, universal definitions when written. In addition, some terms in the
Constitution were terms of art intended to carry a special meaning. Here
again, though, there was not universal agreement regarding such special
definitions. Finally, little reliable evidence exists concerning the extent to
which those who drafted the document had a common understanding of the
purposes of particular provisions, and even less evidence is available to
clarify the understanding of these provisions among the diverse, dispersed
population that participated in the adoption and ratification of the
Constitution.39
may either overstate or understate such ownership. To illustrate, estates of persons
too poor to own guns were less likely to be probated since it was less likely there
was any property to be transferred. On the other hand, persons living in wilderness
areas were more likely than others to be armed, but it was less likely that their heirs
would have gone to distant courts to resolve or record inheritances. See generally
James Lindgren & Justin L. Heather, Counting Guns in EarlyAmerica, 43 WM. &
MARY
38 1

L. REV. 1777 (2002).
TRIBE, supra note 11, at 901 n.221.

39 In

a related context, Professor Adrian Vermeule offers a number of reasons
why judges often are not competent to accurately discern legislative intent from the
history of a statute. He argues that the risks of error caused by judicial
misperceptions of legislative history justify excluding this source from the process
of statutory interpretation. See Adrian Vermeule, LegislativeHistoryand the Limits
of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L.

REV. 1833 (1998). Professor Vermeule's arguments are equally applicable to
controversies surrounding the intent of participants in the Constitutional Convention and state ratification conventions. Although the arguments are persuasive
respecting the need for judicial caution in giving weight to legislative history, for
the reasons discussed in the conclusion of this article, I do not think they justify
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II. INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES DRAWN FROM NON-TEXTUAL SOURCES

Given the difficulty of ascertaining the "plain meaning" of the
Constitution, it is not surprising that from the earliest time, U.S. Supreme
Court Justices have looked to a broad range of external sources both to
discover and to confirm the norms and principles imposed by the Constitution. For example, in what probably was the single most important decision
in the development of American constitutional jurisprudence, Marburyv.
Madison,4" Chief Justice John Marshall applied a variety of textual analysis
techniques to support the Court's conclusion that the Constitution gives the
judiciary the power to vacate unconstitutional statutes.4 In addition, and of
special significance to the concern of this article, Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion for the Court placed particular emphasis on principles drawn from
the following sources: (1) the historical development of the American
constitutional system; (2) political and legal theories respecting the nature
of a written constitution; and (3) the role of the judiciary in maintaining the
rule of law.42

Even if the Justices attempted to take a literalist, "clear meaning"
approach to construing the Constitution, many of its provisions would leave
them with no choice but to consult other sources in order to discern the
principles enshrined in the text. The provision for removal from civil office
on grounds of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"4 3 demonstrates the need to consult external sources to construe
ambiguous provisions: scholars and courts have parsed history to determine
what conduct constitutes a serious abuse of public trust warranting
impeachment. '
A. Non-Textual Authority and the Appointments Clause
The constitutional language governing the authority to appoint
government officers presents a similar problem. The Constitution provides
ignoring this source of possible guidance either when the legal text lacks clear
meaning on its face or when history demonstrates that a meaning that seems
apparent under modem linguistic usage does not reflect how the words were used
or intended when the document was adopted.
40 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
41Id. at 178-80.
42
1Id. at 176-78.
43
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
" It is unsettled, of course, whether the Senate, as the tribunal that hears
impeachment cases, has the sole authority to interpret this part of the Constitution.
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231 (1993).
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that the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint
people to several specified categories of offices, and that this procedure
will also be used for appointment of other "Officers of the United States."45
The text, however, contains no direct language identifying those other
offices. On the other hand, the Appointments Clause provides that Congress
may place the authority to appoint "inferior Officers" either in the President
alone or elsewhere.46 Nowhere, however, does the Constitution define what
makes an officer "inferior" for this purpose, nor does it define "superior"
or "principal" officers,47 whose appointment can be made only by the
President with the advice and consent of a Senate majority. Rather, the text
has left it to the Court to discover the meaning of this incomplete,
imprecise provision.
The U.S. Supreme Court was faced with this issue in a case that
challenged the constitutionality of a statute that called for judicial selection
of an independent counsel to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute certain
high-ranking government officials for alleged violations of federal criminal
laws. The challengers asserted that because the authority to enforce federal
law is a presidential responsibility, the Constitution does not permit the
appointment to be made in a manner that separates the appointee from the
President's ultimate control.48
The Supreme Court, in upholding the statutory method of judicial
appointment of an independent counsel, explained: "We need not attempt
here to decide exactly where the line falls between the two types of
officers, because in our view appellant clearly falls on the 'inferior officer'
'
Without specifying all the elements of the definition of
side of that line."49
"inferior officer," the Court justified its conclusion by noting that the
independent counsel lacked various important attributes of high-ranking
government positions, such as broad discretion to formulate policy and a
'5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
4 Id.
"'Generally, "principal officer" denotes officers of sufficiently high rank or
degree of responsibility to require appointment by the President with the Senate's
advice
and consent. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670 (1987).
48
Id. at 673.
49
Id. at 671.
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broad range of responsibilities. 0 To illustrate, it made observations
respecting both the characteristics of officers constitutionally required to
be appointed by the President with Senate approval, and those of officers
who have always been appointed through that process even though the
Constitution does not expressly require it." l The Court did not identify a
textual source designating the attributes of a principal officer. Rather, its
decision drew upon what are common characteristics of those offices
generally accepted as being of high rank, even though not specifically
designated in the text of the Constitution as requiring presidential
appointment with Senate approval.52 Thus, although in part the Court drew
upon the text of the Constitution to discover the characteristics of principal
officers, it also drew upon historically accepted applications of Congress'
power, an extra-textual norm, as a basis for deciding that the challenged
delegation of appointment authority was constitutionally permissible.
The Constitution's delegation of authority to the federal judiciary to
decide cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction forms another example
of text requiring resort to external sources.5 3 The Supreme Court has
explained that the scope of that jurisdiction is defined by tradition, not by
any explicit constitutional language.' On that basis, the Court held that
admiralty law governed a suit to recover monetary relief when a pile driver
aboard a barge on the Chicago River damaged a tunnel running under the
river and caused flooding of basements in downtown Chicago. 5
50

Id. (noting that the independent counsel is removable by Executive Branch

officials, possesses limited powers, and is confined by limited jurisdiction).
"' Id. at 671-76. The sole dissenter, Justice Scalia, contended that because
Article III of the Constitution uses the word "inferior" in describing the lesser
federal courts, subordination is a necessary attribute of an "inferior officer." Id. at
719-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He explained that an independent counsel appointed
to investigate charges of misconduct by high-ranking executive officers does not
have this attribute, because no other officer can direct the independent counsel's
exercise of discretion. Id. at 722-23. Therefore, he concluded, the independent
counsel is not an "inferior officer." In attempting to bolster his dissent, Justice
Scalia quoted from the definition of "inferiour" in Samuel Johnson's dictionary,
which offered two meanings. Id. at 719. Although Johnson's second meaning is
"subordinate," the first meaning given by Johnson is "lower in place.... station,"
id., and would appear to support the majority's conclusion.
2 Such officers would include the Attorney General, Secretary of State, and
Secretary of the Treasury.
53 U.S. CONST. art. III,' § 2, para. 1.
54 Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527,
531-32 (1995) (noting that, under the traditional test, admiralty jurisdiction
obtains if a tort occurs on navigable waters).
" Id. at 529, 547.
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B. Non-Textual Authority and the Law of Nations
Several provisions of Article I vest Congress with power to adopt or
modify the rules for engaging in foreign relations or foreign commerce. 6
One of these is the delegation of power to Congress to "define and punish
...
Offenses against the Law of Nations.""7 When deciding cases involving
foreign sovereigns or citizens, the Court has examined the law of nations
both to ascertain the scope of Congress' constitutional powers in this area,
and to decide what rules the federal bench should apply if Congress has not
spoken with precision.
For example, an early case raised the question of whether, during the
War of Independence, Virginia had the authority to adopt a law pronouncing debts owed to British subjects fully satisfied by payment to the state of
the amount owed. 8 Based on the treaty of peace with Britain, the U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the debts were not relieved. 9 In the
course of the opinion, however, Justice Chase also cited international law
treatises to support the contention that at the time the payments were due,
Virginia had a right under the law of nations to confiscate the property of
British subjects. 6° Because the Constitution had not been adopted when
Virginia enacted the law at issue, the Court was not constitutionally
required to rely on the law of nations in ascertaining the legitimacy of the
confiscation. Nevertheless, the matter-of-fact manner in which Justice
Chase and other Justices sought guidance from the law of nations reflected
the Court's high level of respect for principles derived from that source and
also indicated that the Justices considered the Court bound by those rules
in the absence of contrary treaties or legislative dictates.
5

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (the power to raise duties, imposts, and
excises); id. art. I, §8, cl. 4 (the power to establish uniform rules of naturalization);
id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (the power to punish piracies and felonies in the high seas and
offenses against the law of nations); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (the power to declare war,
grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules of capture on land and water);
id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (the power to repel invasions). In addition, under Article II,
Section 2, Clause 2, the Senate must approve treaties. Also, as a result of the
derivative power the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, gives to
Congress, it may find additional power to regulate in the sphere of international
law.
"Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
58 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
59 Id.
at 285.
6 1Id.at 230-31.
6See, e.g.,
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A few years later, the Court addressed a confiscation case arising under
the Constitution, Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy.6 That dispute
resulted from actions taken in response to tensions between the United
States and France originating in the late 1790s, when French war ships
were seizing American merchant vessels presumed by the French to be
violating France's embargo on shipping to Britain. The United States
eventually retaliated by passing a law authorizing American privateers to
retake captured American vessels that were in the hands of the French.62
The owner of a retaken schooner, the Charming Betsy, sought restitution
and damages on the ground that the law allowing such conduct did not
authorize the confiscation of his vessel or cargo.63 Explaining the Court's
approach to the task of interpreting the law relied on by the privateer, Chief
Justice Marshall stated:
[A]n Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains, and consequently can
never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce,
further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this
country.64
This statement implied that the Constitution requires that rights recognized
by the law of nations be given full respect by the courts. The Supreme
Court made this proposition explicit a few years later when it announced
that in suits involving claims to cargoes seized as prizes of war, the Court
is "bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land"
unless the federal legislature adopts a rule of law that differs from the
international standard. 65 The Court has continued to follow this principle.'
In CharmingBetsy, Chief Justice Marshall spoke of the law of nations
"as understood in this country. '67 Nonetheless, when resolving questions
of the law of nations, the Supreme Court examines a variety of sources that
are external not only to the Constitution but also to American jurispru-

61Murray

v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
62 See id. at 76.
63
1Id.at 125-26.
64Id. at 118.
65 The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
66See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 400, 404 (1863); The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Summa Corp. v. California ex rel.
State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198, 206-07 n.4 (1984).
67
Murray, 6 U.S. at 118.
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dence.6" In this respect, an instructive illustration of the Court's reliance on
extra-constitutional sources is provided by the evolution of the "act of
state" doctrine in American law, which "began to emerge in the jurisprudence of this country in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. ' 69
In an early statement of the act of state concept, the Supreme Court
explained:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.
Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the
means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves.70
In more recent years the principle has been clarified as follows:
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and
recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or
other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even
if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international
law.7'

The act of state doctrine has been described by the Court as an exercise of
judicial discretion "compelled by neither international law nor the
Constitution,"" but instead as a policy adopted to minimize judicial
interference with diplomatic activities (including secret negotiations), to
foster stability in international transactions, and to promote "progress
"173
toward the goal of establishing the rule of law among nations ....
Nevertheless, a more recent judicial discussion of the doctrine uses an
analytic approach suggesting that, at least in some aspects, it is a principle

the numerous examples of this practice, see The PaqueteHabana,
175 U.S. at 686-708.
69 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (internal
citations omitted).
70 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
71Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
7 Id.
at 427.
6sAmong

73Id. at

437.
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with constitutional status. In the mid- 1970s, four members of the Supreme

Court contended that ifa foreign government engages in purely commercial
activities, the act of state doctrine should not immunize it from answering
in a U.S. court based on the normal rules of international commercial
transactions. 74 Justice White's explanation for this modification, or
clarification, of the act of state doctrine relied in part on the decisions of
other nations' courts and on international law treatises and commentaries.
These materials showed that a growing number of nations accept the
normative proposition that governments engaged in purely commercial
activities should be treated in the same manner as other commercial
entities. 75 Because that conclusion was based on interpretation of the law
of nations, implicitly it is presented as a matter of constitutional law.
C. Non- Textual Authority and the FourteenthAmendment's Due Process
Clause
Especially significant in the development of American constitutional
law is the Supreme Court's use of extra-textual sources to interpret the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which declares that the
states shall not deprive any person of "life, liberty or property, without due
process of law ..... The Fifth Amendment, which limits the power of the
federal government, includes the same due process language. The Bill of
Rights prohibits the federal government from encroaching upon the
freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly;76 the right to not be exposed
to an unreasonable search;7 7 and the right to a lawyer and a jury trial in
criminal cases.78 The Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, was
adopted separately and does not contain a similar list of specific rights.
Nevertheless, it was adopted as a corrective measure to ensure that state
and local governments not exercise their power oppressively.79 The
constitutional text is therefore unclear as to whether the Due Process

"4Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695
(1976).
11 Id. at 701-05.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Id. amend. IV.

77

78
79

Id. amend. VI, VII.
See, e.g., AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUC-

103 (1998) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment "radically transform[ed]
the nature of American federalism" by requiring the states to honor individual
rights).
TION
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights'
freedoms.
Perhaps the most interesting judicial debate respecting the proper
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was an
exchange in Adamson v. California,a case in which a 5-4 majority ruled
that the protection against compulsory self-incrimination is not violated
when a state law allows a prosecutor to comment to the jury about the
defendant's failure to testify.80 Such prosecutorial commentary had been
found to violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination under
the Fifth Amendment. 8'
In a concurring opinion in Adamson, explaining why he agreed with the
majority's decision not to extend the federal rule to state trials, Justice
Frankfurter asserted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment has a meaning separate from the provisions of the Bill of
Rights. He contended:
Judicial review of that guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole
course of the proceedings in order to ascertain whether they offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most
heinous offenses. These standards of justice are not authoritatively
formulated anywhere as though they were prescriptions in a pharmacopoeia. But neither does the application of the Due Process Clause imply
that judges are wholly at large. The judicial judgment in applying the Due
Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted notions ofjustice
and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal
82
judgment.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1947), overruled in part by
Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
8 Id. at 50.
82 Id. at 67-68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter offered no
explanation for confining the reference sources to notions of justice of Englishspeaking people. One can only assume that this was intended to reflect the British
common law background of most American jurisdictions. A number of states,
including California, the state in which Adamson was tried, as well as Louisiana,
Arkansas, and Texas, derived much of their early doctrinal principles and
procedural structures from civil law. See M.H. Hoeflich, Translation and the
Reception of ForeignLaw in the Antebellum United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
753, 755 (2002). Those influences continue to shape aspects of their local legal
systems.
80
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In sharp contrast with that position was a dissenting opinion prepared
by Justice Black and joined by Justice Douglas. Black took an originalist
approach, arguing that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that it was intended to require the states to adhere to all the Bill of
Rights provisions. 3 In support of that contention, he appended a summary
of what he considered relevant events and comments relating to the
adoption of the amendment. He additionally urged that the protections
afforded by the Bill of Rights are salutary because they reflect historical
experiences in combating governmental oppression:
In my judgment the people of no nation can lose their liberty so long
as a Bill of Rights like ours survives and its basic purposes are conscientiously interpreted, enforced and respected so as to afford continuous
protection against old, as well as new, devices and practices which might
thwart those purposes. I fear to see the consequences of the Court's
practice of substituting its own concepts of decency and fundamental
justice for the language of the Bill of Rights as its point of departure in
interpreting and enforcing that Bill of Rights. 84
Justice Murphy wrote a separate dissent in Adamson, joined by Justice
Rutledge. He argued that the Due Process Clause not only incorporates all
of the textual guarantees of the Bill of Rights, as asserted by Black, but also
requires adherence to fundamental standards of procedure even if there is
no violation of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights. 5
Less than two decades later, by a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court
reversed the specific holding in Adamson, finding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide
defendants with the same protection against compulsory self-incrimination
as the federal government affords under the Fifth Amendment. 6 Quoting
with approval from an early decision, the Court explained:
[A]ny compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath.., to convict
him of crime... is contrary to the principles of a free government. It is
83 Adamson,

332 U.S. at 71-72 and app. at 92-123 (Black, J., dissenting).
4Id. at 89.
81 Id. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
6Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); see also Carter
v. Kentucky, 450 U.S.
288, 305 (1981) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment, like the Fifth, requires
that upon the defendant's request, the trial court instruct the jury that no negative
inferences are to be drawn from the defendant's failure to testify).
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abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts
of an American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot
87
abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom.
The debate among the Justices in Adamson, and the eventual shift in
approach, were repeated with respect to other Bill of Rights provisions. For
example, Palko v. Connecticut,"s a decision relied on by the majority of the
Court in Adamson, involved a defendant who in his first trial had been
convicted of murder in the second degree, a crime not subject to the death
penalty. The state prosecutor appealed to the state's high court and obtained
a retrial of the original first-degree murder charge, which could result in the
death penalty.89 On retrial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder and was sentenced to death.9" The Supreme Court heard the case to
consider whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited the retrial on the ground that it constituted double jeopardy.
Because the Fifth Amendment expressly prohibits a person "to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb" for the same offense, the defendant argued that
subjecting him to the second trial violated the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibition against taking life or liberty without due process of law.9'
Under prior decisions, the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth
Amendment would have barred retrial in a federal prosecution despite the
prosecutor's showing of trial errors. 92 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court,
with just a single dissenting vote, ruled that this protection is not available
to a state court defendant under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, explained that although
some specific liberties listed in the Bill of Rights, such as the freedom of
expression, religion and assembly, and the right to counsel in a criminal
case, are implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause's
protection of ordered liberty, not all constitutional restrictions on the
Malloy, 378 U.S. at 9 n.7 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
631-36
(1886) (omissions in original)).
88Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruledby Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
89 Id. at 321. On appeal, the prosecution contended that the trial court had
erroneously excluded testimony concerning the defendant's confession, excluded
certain prosecution cross-examination, and given incorrect instructions to the jury.
90 Id. at 321-22.
9 d. at 322.
92 See id. at 322-23 (citing Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) and
Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905)).
87
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federal government specified in the Bill of Rights are absorbed into the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the Court explained that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause protects only those rights that are
essential to the preservation of ordered liberty-those whose denial would
sacrifice the existence of liberty or justice.9 3 In explaining why the double
jeopardy protection is not such an essential protection, Cardozo cited
scholarly works reporting that double jeopardy is not forbidden in other
legal systems. 94
In Betts v. Brady, a 6-3 majority of the Court concluded that a state did
not have a constitutional obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause to provide legal counsel to an indigent criminal
defendant in a non-death penalty case.95 In reaching that result, the Court
examined the past and current practices of state courts and legislatures
concerning the provision of counsel for indigent defendants and concluded
that under the circumstances of the case, the failure to provide the
defendant with counsel was not "offensive to the common and fundamental
ideas of fairness. 96 In contrast, Justice Black, dissenting, cited pronouncements in earlier case decisions, as well as some states' statutory requirements of counsel, to argue that denial of appointed counsel to impoverished
defendants charged with serious crimes "has long been regarded as
shocking to the 'universal sense of justice' throughout this country." 97
Eventually, the Supreme Court overruled both Palko and Betts.98 By a
7-2 margin in Benton v. Maryland, the Court condemned the Palko
approach as a watered-down standard of the American scheme of justice,
announcing that the guarantee against double jeopardy is of a fundamental
nature.99 The Court explained that this right's origins can be traced to
ancient Greece and Rome, and that the right was established in England
long before the founding of the United States. Of particular interest to this
discussion, Justice Harlan's concurrence, joined by Justice Stewart,
emphasized that Harlan did not read the Court's opinion as accepting the

931Id. at

323-28.
325-26 n.3.
" Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
96
Id. at 473.
97 Id.
at 476-77 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. app. 477-80 (listing state
statutes requiring counsel for indigent defendants in non-capital cases).
98 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
99 Benton, 395 U.S. at 795.
94 Id. at
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notion that all protections of the Bill of Rights automatically restrict state
power under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.'0 0
Similarly, the Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright unanimously
overruled Betts. The Court's opinion explained that the earlier decision had
deviated from the American tradition concerning the importance of the
right to counsel in obtaining a fair trial.' Writing for the Court, Justice
Black also stated:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.... Lawyers to prosecute are
everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly
society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few
indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and
present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest
indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
02
necessities, not luxuries.'
When we review these examples of the evolution of the Court's
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we can
see that, because of the vagueness of that provision, in each decision the
Justices looked beyond the constitutional text to find guiding principles.
And in each, they found that guidance in their perceptions of prior and
contemporary practices, in their impressions of "widespread belief" (as
Justice Black characterized it in Gideon),' 3 and in their deductive analysis
of the principle of procedural fairness.
D. Non-Textual Authority and the Eighth Amendment
Still another situation in which the Constitution's text invites reliance
upon external sources is the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against the
infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments,"'0 4 a phrase that inherently
'0o
Id. at 801.
o'Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-45.
'02 Id. at 344.
103
Id.
'04 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
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necessitates exploring contemporary or historic norms and principles. In
recent decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has been closely divided regarding
the proper interpretation of this language. This0tension
was illustrated in the
5
Court's recent decision in Atkins v. Virginia.1
That case involved the appeal of Daryl Atkins, who, together with
William Jones, robbed a victim at gunpoint, then drove him to an automatic
teller machine and forced him to withdraw more money. The defendants
then drove the victim to an isolated location where either Atkins or Jones
shot the victim eight times. Each claimed the other committed the murder,
and at trial Jones testified against Atkins." 6 Atkins had sixteen prior felony
convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, abduction, use of a firearm, and
maiming, and the record indicated that he gave unpersuasive, inconsistent
testimony. 10 7 However, based on a review of Atkins' school and court
records, Atkins' score of fifty-nine on a standard intelligence test, and
interviews with Atkins and others familiar with him, a psychologist
testified that he was "mildly mentally retarded."'0 8 Based on similar
interviews and a review of records, but not on an intelligence test, a
psychologist testifying for the prosecution concluded that Atkins was not
mentally retarded, but instead had average intelligence and an antisocial
personality.'0 9 The prosecution's psychologist testified that Atkins did
poorly on assigned tasks "because he did not want to do what he was
required to do."" 0 Under state law, ajury sentenced Atkins to be executed.
The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the sentence and rejected the argument
that a mentally retarded defendant cannot be sentenced to death."'

By a 6-3 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the death sentence and
remanded the case to the state court for reconsideration." 2 The majority
opinion stated the Eighth Amendment draws "its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."' " The majority then explained that when legislative acts reveal a

S
16

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

0 Id. at 307.

Id. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
308-09. The score range for the intelligence test is 45-155, with 100
being the mean. Only one to three percent of the population scores lower than
70-75. A score below 70 is generally regarded as mental retardation. Id. at 309 n.5.
107

'08 Id. at

'09 Id.

at 309.

"o Id.
"'

at 309 n.6.
Id. at 309-10.

"2 Id. at 321.
"3 Id. at 311-12 (quoting with approval Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01
(1958)).
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consensus regarding the citizenry's opinion of suitable criminal punishments, the Court will accept this judgment unless it finds reason to disagree
with it. The Court observed that in addition to the fourteen states that did
not allow the death penalty, the federal legislature and eighteen states had
barred its use on the mentally retarded, and similar legislation was pending
in some other states. It also reported that executions of mentally retarded
defendants rarely occur even in those states that permit them, and that the
pattern of change has been consistently in the direction of eliminating the
death penalty as a punishment for the mentally retarded." 4 From this, the
Court majority concluded: "[T]oday our society views mentally retarded
offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal. The
evidence carries even greater force when it is noted that the legislatures that
have addressed the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the
prohibition.""1 5 In a footnote, the majority opinion deemed the consensus
against such executions evident from the positions of relevant professional
associations and leadership of diverse religious communities, from public
16
opinion polls, and from penal standards adopted in many foreign nations.
In order to decide whether there was reason to disagree with this social
consensus, the opinion then examined the factual and analytical grounds for
concluding that mentally retarded individuals should be treated as less
culpable than others and less capable than others of defending themselves
against false or misleading accusations. It considered those findings sound
and, therefore, held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing the
death penalty on mentally retarded defendants." 7
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in two
dissenting opinions. Although the dissenters accepted the majority's
characterization, following Trop v. Dulles, of the Eight Amendment as
embracing an evolving standard of decency, Chief Justice Rehnquist
condemned the weight the majority placed "on foreign laws, the views of
professional and religious organizations, and opinion polls in reaching its
conclusion." "8 Instead, he argued that, in a democratic society, contemporary moral assessment of the propriety of a punishment is the proper
domain of the state legislature and the trial jury, not the federal courts. The
" 4 Id. at 313-16.
115 Id.
1 6 Id. at
7

1

316 n.21.

Id. at 318-21.

Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's dissent was even
more emphatic in condemning the majority's references to practices in other
nations. Id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1..
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Chief Justice also questioned the reliability of public opinion data cited by
the majority." 9 A dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia additionally asserted
that the majority position misrepresented the consensus respecting
exemption of mentally retarded persons from the death penalty. He
complained that the eighteen legislatures that had passed such legislation
represented but a minority of those states in which the death penalty is
permitted. He also noted that a majority had adopted the legislative change
prospectively with the result that some mentally retarded defendants could
still be executed after the change had been adopted. He commented: "That
is not a statement of absolute moral repugnance, but one of current
preference between two tolerable approaches."' 20
Justice Scalia further argued that the majority's reliance on external
sources purporting to reflect public disapproval of capital punishment for
mentally retarded persons in fact served as a mere subterfuge for imparting
the Justices' own notions of fairness into the Constitution. With characteristic lack of self-restraint, he asserted:
The arrogance of this assumption of power takes one's breath away. And
it explains, of course, why the Court can be so cavalier about the evidence
of consensus. It is just a game, after all. "In the end," it is thefeelings and
intuition of a majority of the Justices that count---'the perceptions of
decency, or of penology, or of mercy, entertained... by a majority of the

small and unrepresentative segment of our society that sits on this
1
Court.'

,12

Justice Scalia also challenged the logic of the Court's underlying
rationale for exempting mentally retarded persons from a punishment that
can be administered to others. He pointed out that because the majority
accepted the contention that a mentally retarded offender can know the
difference between right and wrong, the proper test would be to permit the
sentencer to assess "whether [the defendant's] retardation reduces his
culpability enough to exempt him from the death penalty for the particular
'
murder in question."122
Finally, in response to the majority's explanation that mentally retarded
defendants have special difficulties in assisting their counsel and offering
persuasive testimony, Justice Scalia stated:
19 Id. at 325-27 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

Id.
at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 873 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal citations omitted).
122Id. at 351

(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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I suppose a similar "special risk" could be said to exist for just plain
stupid people, inarticulate people, even ugly people. If this unsupported
claim has any substance to it (which I doubt), it might support a due
process claim in all criminal prosecutions of the mentally retarded; but it
is hard to see how it has anything to do with an Eighth Amendment
claim
12 3
that execution of the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual.
Only Justice Scalia and those who joined this opinion can say whether this
statement was intended to be a serious assertion or was merely hyperbole
resulting from excessively emotional rhetoric. Clearly, the quoted
contention ignores the fact that the death penalty, unlike long prison terms,
is irreversible if error is later discovered. It is because of this special
characteristic of punishment by execution that the majority was prompted
to take extraordinary precautions in limiting its availability.
For purposes of this examination of constitutional decision-making in
the United States, several insights emerge from the Supreme Court's
contentious analysis of the constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. First, in deciding the Atkins case, all of the Justices
joined in opinions that accepted the proposition that discovering the correct
meaning of this provision necessitates going beyond the text and finding
guidance from other sources. Thus, the decision demonstrates that, at least
in some instances, resort to external sources of guidance is a universal
characteristic of the analytical approach of U.S. Supreme Court Justices.
The Justices do, however, differ in the frequency with which they cite to
such sources.

124

Secondly, the Justices do not agree on the degree of weight to be
accorded to particular factual assertions of social scientists and other nonlegislative or non-judicial observers of American norms and principles.
Although, inAtkins, the majority of the Justices gave some weight to social
science findings, the dissenters asserted that such findings should be
disregarded due to imperfections in methods of empirical research and
analysis. This argument, however, begs the following question: Even if
scientific deficiencies exist in some social science studies, are these
inaccuracies likely to be greater than those resulting from the judiciary's
Id. at 352 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124 An empirical study of 1996 Supreme Court decisions documents the Court's
frequent resort to external sources in cases involving statutory construction. See
Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme
CourtStatutoryInterpretation:Implicationsfor the LegislativeHistoryDebateand
Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, (1998).
123
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reliance on its own, no doubt often inaccurate, perceptions of human
behavior or social consensus? The judiciary's deficiencies in assessing
individual behavior and the mechanics of social structure are well
illustrated by the fact that for centuries common law jurisdictions treated
women, especially married women, as less than legally competent with
respect to many types of activities. The justification included the judi-

ciary's perceptions (misperceptions) respecting the mental stability and
capacities of women and the assumed need for and inevitability of a wife's

subservience in order to maintain household tranquility.'25
Finally, even though the Court majority in Atkins accepted the
proposition that analysis of the Constitution can be improved by consulting
the jurisprudence of other legal systems, the three dissenters vigorously
insisted that only American sources can legitimately guide the Court's
determination of whether a punishment offends the Eighth Amendment.' 26
In relation to this last point, it is interesting to observe that in the delibera25

' For example, in Towers v. Hagner,3 Whart. 48 (Pa. 1838), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in explaining why a wife was not permitted to bring a suit without
joining her husband, stated:
In contemplation of law, the wife is scarcely considered to have a separate
existence: she and her husband constitute but one person, and all the rights
and duties which are hers at the period of the marriage, become his, during
the continuance of that union. This unity of the persons of the husband and
wife, is the source from which her disability to maintain suit is derived.
Id. at60.
For similar sentiments in a case in which a court refused to enforce a wife's
support claims based on a separation agreement, see Simpson v. Simpson, 34 Ky.
(4 Dana) 140 (1836).
See, too, the concurring opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 140-42
(1872), where Justice Bradley, joined by Justices Swayne and Field, rejected the
assertion that women have a right to seek a license to practice law:
It is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations founded on
nature, reason, and experience for the due admission of qualified persons
to professions and callings demanding special skill and confidence. This
fairly belongs to the police power of the State; and, in my opinion, in view
of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of woman, it is within
the province of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings
shall be filled and discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those
energies and responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are
presumed to predominate in the sterner sex.
Id. at 142.
126Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 347-48 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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tions of the Constitutional Convention and the debates respecting the
proposed ratification of the Constitution, frequent references were made to
the rules of other legal systems, to wisdom gained from historical experiences of other nations, and to what in modem terminology would be
characterized as political, social, and economic theory posited by worldrenowned scholars. 27 Moreover, the very phrase "cruel and unusual
punishment" traces its origins to a 1689 English case in which the House
of Lords decided that a fine imposed on Lord Devonshire for assault and
battery "was excessive and exorbitant, against Magna Charta, the common
right of the subject, and the law of the land."'' 28 How unseemly can it be to
seek guidance from standards and practices of other societies when
applying a legal concept that was itself adopted from another nation's
jurisprudence? 2 9
E. Non-Textual Authority and Substantive Due Process
Probably the most controversial modem example of the U.S. Supreme
Court's resort to extra-textual sources was its decision in Roe v. Wade, the
case in which a 7-2 majority decided that a state can neither prohibit a
woman from obtaining a medical abortion during the first trimester of
pregnancy nor impose excessive restrictions on such procedures during the
second trimester. 3 ° The Roe plaintiffs challenged a state statute that made
it a crime to procure or perform an abortion unless it was "with medical
advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother."'' At the time, a
majority of states had similar laws.'32
Before addressing the issue of whether a woman has a constitutional
right to terminate her pregnancy, Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,
drew upon scholarly accounts to examine the ancient and more recent

'

27

THE FEDERALIST passim (Alexander

MURPHY,

Hamilton, John Jay, James Madison);

supra note 18 passim; THE RECORDS OF THE

FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787 passim (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
128 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 376 (1910) (citing State v. Driver,
78 N.C. 423 (N.C. 1878)).
129 For an extended analysis of this point, see Harold Hongju Koh, Paying
"DecentRespect" to World Opinionon the DeathPenalty,35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1085 (2002).
130 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that, during the second
trimester, the state may regulate abortion only to the extent necessary to protect
maternal health).
' Id. at 117-18.
'32 Id. at 118.
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history of social and religious attitudes and reactions to abortion. He found
persuasive one theorist's proposition that societies' acceptance or rejection
of abortion was determined in large part33by their philosophic or religious
perceptions of when human life begins. 1
Justice Blackmun's opinion, based on ancient and modem treatises,
also observed that early British common law decisions did not criminalize
abortion performed prior to the fetus's becoming "animated" or "quickened" around the sixteenth to eighteenth week of pregnancy. 34 Blackmun
linked the establishment of this line of demarcation to a "confluence of
earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and canon law concepts of when
life begins."' 135 Additionally, he noted disagreement as to whether at
common law the abortion of a quickened fetus was a felony, a lesser crime,
or no crime at all, and that common-law attitudes on this subject changed
over the centuries. Around the time of the founding of the U.S. constitutional system, the prevalent common-law view seemed to be that abortion
after quickening was not a felony. 36 Blackmun also cited a modem scholar
who argued that post-quickening abortion was at no point a common-law
crime. 137 The common-law view held sway in the U.S. until after the Civil
War, when several states adopted legislation prohibiting abortion both
before and after quickening. Generally, these statutes treated pre-quickening abortions as a lesser offense. The statutory prohibitions and penalties
grew harsher, however, and by the mid-twentieth century most states had
made all abortions a serious crime unless necessary to save the mother's
life. Nonetheless, a few jurisdictions adopted a broader exception for
abortions necessary to preserve the mother's health.'38
On the other hand, Justice Blackmun reported that in the approximately
ten years preceding Roe, the trend had reversed in some states: about a third
of the state legislatures had relaxed abortion restrictions. 13 A few had
decriminalized abortions; others had adopted lesser penalties for abortions
performed early in pregnancy and expanded the situations in which
33

Id. at 130-32.
'14Id. at 132-33.
'

'

35

Id. at 133.

Id. at 134-35 (noting that courts relied on Coke's statement that postquickening abortion was "a great misprision, and no murder" (quoting SIR EDWARD
136

COKE, INSTITUTES III * 50)).
37

' Id. at 135 (citing Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix ofAbortionalFreedom,
17 N.Y.L. F. 335 (1971)).
38

'

39

Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 140.
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abortions were allowed.140 These exceptions included rape, pregnancy due
to illicit intercourse with a girl under age sixteen, incest, the potential birth
of a child with a grave mental or physical defect, or serious endangerment
of the mother's health.' 4 ' These provisions reflected a recent change in the
position of the nation's largest physician group, the American Medical
Association, which had moved from total opposition to abortion, to
endorsing a statement accepting its legitimacy under the above special
circumstances. Eventually, the organization adopted a statement indicating
that it no longer opposed abortions performed by licensed medical
personnel after the mother's consultation with a physician. Justice
Blackmun also cited recent positions by other professional groups that
42
supported less severe restrictions on abortions.
The Court's opinion then turned to the possible justifications for
restrictions on abortion procedures. Relying on published medical reports,
the Court rejected the contention that criminalizing the procedure was a
justified safeguard of the woman's health. 43 Justice Blackmun explained
that the mortality risks of early abortions are lower than the risks of
carrying a pregnancy to full term.'"
This brought the Court to the core of the constitutional issue, the
assertion that anti-abortion laws are justified by the government's interest
in protecting unborn human life. The thesis of this argument is that the state
legislature has a duty to treat all human life equally, to place the protection
of a human life above competing personal interests of others, and to decide
when life begins. Blackmun noted that courts sustaining state anti-abortion
laws had held them to be a legitimate exercise of legislative responsibility
to prevent the taking of a person's life without due process of law. The
courts had held that this due process concern extends, as well, to protecting
potential human life. 45 Justice Blackmun's analysis of this issue began by
reviewing various contexts in which the Court had found that the right of
personal privacy' 46 is implicit in the protections of the first nine amend

'4 Id. at
141Id. at

140 & n.37.

147 n.40.

Id. at 140-47.
143 Id. at 149-50.
'44Id.
at 149.
145 Id. at 156.
",See id. at 153-56. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart characterized the
liberty at stake as "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person .... ." Id. at 169 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
142
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ments as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and that a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy, though not absolute, is within the scope
of the right to personal privacy. 47 Because the right to privacy is not
absolute, it must give way if the government has a compelling purpose for
interfering with it and has selected the least restrictive means of accomplishing that purpose.
In order to assess whether abortion prohibitions are supported by a
compelling interest, the Court next examined the question of whether a
fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. In dicta,
the Court noted a logical inconsistency between the justification that antiabortion laws protect the life of a person, and exceptions in the Texas
statute and other anti-abortion laws, which permit abortions under some
circumstances and impose a lesser penalty than that imposed for taking the
life of a person by other means.1 4' Nevertheless, the Court did not rest its
decision on such inconsistencies. Justice Blackmun surveyed an array of
religious, philosophical, medical and biological writings evidencing a wide
divergence of opinion respecting when human life begins. He also
examined how courts treat the status of a fetus in other contexts and
concluded "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons

"Autonomy" is probably the more succinct term to use and is more accurate than
"personal privacy." Cf.Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,851-52 (1992)
(describing the right as encompassing "choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy").
147 Id. at 152-56. Courts had located this privacy interest variously in the First
Amendment, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Ninth Amendment, and the
liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 152-53. Courts had also
traced the privacy right more broadly to the "penumbras of the Bill of Rights." Id.
The Roe majority preferred the view locating the right in the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty guarantee. Id. Traditionally, the first eight amendments have been
referred to as the Bill of Rights. The Ninth Amendment reads: "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." It has been read variously as a canon of interpretation requiring the Court to read expansively the Constitution's explicit list of
protected liberties, and as an incorporation into the Constitution of all those
liberties that are the natural rights of a free people who have surrendered to the
government only that part of their natural rights necessary to establish a system of
ordered liberty. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,488 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). The latter proposition is supported, as well, by the Preamble of the
Constitution,
which lists among its purposes securing "the blessings of liberty."
148 Id. at 157 n.54.
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in the whole sense."' 49 Therefore, he explained, the government cannot
override a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by merely adopting a
highly debatable definition of when life begins. The Court went on,
however, to note that the government's interest in a woman's health and in
the potential birth of a child increases as fetal development progresses,
justifying progressively more intrusive restrictions at the more advanced
stages of pregnancy.' 50
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist observed that when the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause was adopted, most states had laws
limiting the right to engage in abortion and suggested, therefore, that the
states could not have contemplated a right to terminate a pregnancy as
falling within the amendment's protections. 5' This argument, of course,
assumed without discussion the erroneous premise that the Constitution is
amended solely to preserve the status quo. Rehnquist also argued: "The fact
that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority sentiment in
those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century is a
strong indication, it seems to me, that the asserted right to an abortion is not
'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.' ""52
Dissenting in Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton, Justice White
condemned the Court for requiring the state to demonstrate that it had a
compelling governmental purpose to justify the burden its law placed on a
woman seeking an abortion.'53 He argued that it was sufficient for there to
be a legitimate governmental purpose, and that the state legislature should
be permitted to strike a reasonable balance between the competing
communal and individual interests. Justice White concluded: "As an
exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what
it does today; but in my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power ofjudicial review that the Constitution extends
to this Court."' 54
Justice White's willingness to rely on the legislative will to balance
competing personal and communal interests disregards the fact that in large

149

Id. at 162.
Id. at 163-65.
'.' Id. at 174-75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52
'
Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
'53 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,221-23 (1973). White indicated that his dissent
applied
equally to Roe. Id. at 221.
54
'

'

Id. at 222.
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measure, the concept of constitutional protection of individual liberty is a
check on democratic prerogatives. In a system of representative government, despite problems of political corruption or apathy, eventually
interests having popular support can be expected to prevail. Although
constitutional protections are needed to preserve the structures for
registering the popular will, if those representative structures are in place,
seldom must constitutional protections be invoked to ensure adoption of the
populace's prevailing policy desires. In contrast, when persons, conduct, or
expression are disfavored by the majority, repression is likely to prevail
absent constitutional protection. For this reason there is wisdom in the
principle applied in Roe of requiring the government to demonstrate a
compelling public need before restricting the exercise of a fundamental
individual right. 155
I.

THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY MYTH

In the previous illustrations of Supreme Court debates regarding the
respective roles of constitutional text and external sources in reaching
constitutional decisions, the more conservative members of the Court
chided their brethren, accusing them of going beyond the text's apparent or
historical meaning. But as we already have seen, the Court's conservatives
do not always resist, and sometimes are compelled to seek, guidance
beyond the text.' 56 The most striking example of this is these Justices'
reliance in recent years on concepts of federalism and sovereign immunity,
phrases not found in the Constitution, to support the proposition that
federal power cannot provide individual redress against state conduct
unless Congress acts under the authority ofpowers expressly granted by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A. State Autonomy Concerns Among the Framers
During both the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and the
ratification process, unquestionably a core issue was the extent to which
federal power would be able to supersede the authority of the states. 57 The
Anti-Federalists, who included Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry, feared
that a central government would become a source of uncontrollable
"' Cf United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
156 See, e.g., supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
' See KELLY ET AL., supra note 12, at 90-96.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 92

oppression and that interests of less populated regions would be ignored by
the national government.5 8 Those fears in part were placated by establishing an upper legislative chamber in which each state had the same number
of representatives, and by giving the federal government only enumerated
powers. 5 9 Additionally, a few specific limitations were imposed on federal
power. These included not allowing Congress to prohibit the slave trade
until 1808 and placing a cap on the tax that Congress could impose on the
importation of people; "6 requiring uniformity in any federal duties, imposts
or excises;' 6' forbidding the levy of federal taxes on goods exported from
63
a state; 62 and requiring that regulation of ports be equal.1
On balance, however, the Constitution substantially shifted to the
central government the ultimate power to protect, promote, regulate, and
represent the interests of the people of the United States. And, although
considerable discussion in the Constitutional Convention addressed
concerns regarding the effects a more powerful central government would
have on the citizens and the states, no mention was made of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. 64
Moreover, the original Constitution clearly made the states subservient
to federal authority. Thus, Article VI explicitly states that the Constitution
and federal laws and treaties are supreme and binding on state as well as
federal courts. 65 In addition, in defining the power of the federal courts,
' See, e.g., Patrick Henry's Remarks at Virginia's Ratification Convention
(June 14, 1788), in NEIL H. COGAN, CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 504-06

(1999). Similar views were expressed by some delegates to the Constitutional
Convention. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note
127, at 178 (statement of William Paterson, delegate from New Jersey).
9 See MURPHY, supra note 18, at 74-75. For example, Paterson, see supra
note 158, left the Convention after the House-Senate compromise was reached but
eventually returned to sign the Constitution. Id. at 74. He later was a U.S. Senator
from New Jersey, where he served on the Judiciary Committee. Id. at 75. He left
the Senate to be Governor of New Jersey from 1790 to 1795, when he resigned to
accept an appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court. He served on the Court until his
death in 1806. Id.
160 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
161Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
62

1

Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.

163

Id.

16 See 4 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 127, at 216
(word and general index ofthe Convention debates, in which "sovereign immunity"
does not appear as a term).
165 U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
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Article IIextendsjurisdiction not only based on the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States, but also based on categories of parties, such

166
as "Controversies... between a State and Citizens of another State."'
This parties-based grant of jurisdiction could potentially prevent a state

court from enforcing the state's own criminal laws, tax laws, and government contracts if a non-citizen of the state was a party to the action.
Furthermore, the state-citizen diversity provision implies that the common
law notion of sovereign immunity does not apply to the states when sued
in federal court. This may have appeared to the framers to be a necessary
feature of federal judicial authority inasmuch as Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution places a variety of specific restraints on state power in dealing
with individuals. 167 The vindication of those protections obviously
necessitates allowing an individual to sue an offending state sovereign.
The need to enshrine in the Constitution national sovereignty, not state
sovereignty, was evident even to such leaders of the Constitutional
Convention as George Mason of Virginia, an outspoken proponent of
states' rights. In a memorandum written during the Convention, he
observed that the states, which as colonies were under the Crown and
thereafter were within the Confederation, had never operated as distinct and
independent nations. 68 Mason refused to sign the Constitution because it
did not contain a Bill of Rights, and, in his opinion, gave so much power
to the federal legislative and judicial branches that their state counterparts
could ultimately be without meaningful power. 69 That view, though
perhaps an exaggerated reading of the document, revealed that Mason, for
one, did not perceive the Constitution as providing a fortress to preserve
sovereign prerogatives of the states.
James Madison, who signed the Constitution and championed its
ratification, similarly recognized that the new charter was a major
encroachment on state authority. He posted a copy ofthe Constitution to his
friend and mentor Thomas Jefferson, who was abroad, together with a
description of some of the more highly debated issues and the reasons for
his satisfaction with the more important compromises. 7 ' He explained that
" Id. art. III, § 2, para. 1.
'67Id.
art. I, § 10, cl. 2. These restraints included limitations on a state's levy of
imposts or duties, and prohibitions against state-issued bills of attainder, ex post
facto laws, laws impairing the obligation of contracts, or laws adopting a

requirement that payment be accepted in other than silver or gold. Id.
'614
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 127, at 75-76.
'69 MURPHY,supra note 18, at 69-70.
110 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 127, at 20,

34-35, 131-36.
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of the different government structures discussed, the Convention "embraced the alternative of a Government which instead of operating, on the
States, should operate without their intervention on the individuals
composing them . . . .""' He also expressed fear that states might resist
judicial protection of individuals but offered the opinion that the authority
of the federal judiciary allowed it to keep the states within their proper
72
limits.
On the other hand, during the ratification debates some participants in
favor of ratification sought to assure skeptics that Article III did not unduly
encroach on state sovereignty. In the New York ratification debates, an
Anti-Federalist pamphlet had claimed that the Article I state-citizen
diversity provision would "'humble' the states by subjecting undesirable
liability."'7 Hamilton prepared The FederalistNo. 81 to rebut this claim.
In ambiguous language which was inconsistent with the apparent meaning
of the constitutional text, he stated:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent ....[A]nd the exemption, as one of the
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State
in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in
the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger
intimated must be merely ideal.... To what purpose would it be to
authorize suits against States for the debts they owe? How could
174
recoveries be enforced?
Hamilton's statement can be understood not as reading out of Article III the
language giving the federal courts jurisdiction in "Controversies . . .
between a State and Citizens of another State," but rather as a suggestion
that Congress, in regulating federal court jurisdiction, would never
authorize such a claim for relief. Such an understanding of Hamilton's
argument would explain the otherwise cryptic assertion that "the danger
intimated must be merely ideal."'7
In The FederalistNos. 45 and 46, Madison attempted to quiet concerns
about federal encroachment on state authority. He did so largely by
''

Id. at 132.

'21d.at

132, 134.
William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationofthe EleventhAmendment,
35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1047 (1983).
74
' THE FEDERALISTNO. 81, at 248 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed.,
1966).
11

175Id.
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demonstrating that under the new plan of government, the people of the
states retained more than ample political and even military power to thwart
abuses by the federal government. In his introduction of the topic in The
FederalistNo. 45,however, he made it clear that while one might speak of
federal or state sovereignty, the ultimate sovereign authority resides in the
people: "[A]s far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to
the happiness of the people,... let the former be sacrificed to the latter."' 6
Others in the ratifying conventions also tried to quiet fears respecting
the scope of federal authority by reassuring constituents that the provision
for state-citizen suits in federal court applied only when the state was
plaintiff. But that strained reading of the wording did not sit well with other
supporters of the Constitution, such as Edmund Randolph, a member of the
Convention's Committee of Detail, who declared that not only could a state
be held accountable to individuals in federal court but also that the state
should have such accountability.' 77
Several state ratifying conventions considered proposals to amend the
Constitution by modifying the scope of federal court authority to hear suits
against states, 178 and a few adopted such proposals.'79 Some of these
proposals would have preserved, in words or substance, the proposition that
a state enjoys sovereign immunity from suit. A South Carolinian proposed
an amendment to the Bill of Rights that would remove state-citizen
diversity jurisdiction from Article III, but the proposal was not considered
by the full House of Representatives.' 80
B. States' Sovereign Immunity: Chisholm v. Georgia and the Eleventh
Amendment
Not too many years after the Constitution's ratification, the Supreme
Court was presented with a case in which the plaintiff looked to a federal
court to vindicate a claim against a state. Chisholm v. Georgia 8 ' was filed
by Alexander Chisholm, the executor of the estate of a Captain Farquhar,
176 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 134-139 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed.,

1966).
177
Fletcher, supra note 173, at 1049-50.
178 New York, for example, entertained but rejected a proposal that would have
deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction over suits against states. Id. at 1052.
179
Id. at 1051-52. Virginia, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and

New Hampshire all proposed such an amendment.
80 Id. at 1052-53.
181Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment as stated in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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a South Carolina resident who had allegedly sold goods to the state of
Georgia for $169,613.33.182 Because Farquhar was a British loyalist,
Georgia refused to honor the debt on the ground that it had been extinguished by a statute adopted after the debt had been incurred. 3 Because a
state was a party, the executor of Farquhar's estate invoked the U.S.
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and brought his action in assumpsit
directly to the Court."8 Although it made a special appearance through
counsel to announce that it denied that the Court had jurisdiction," s5 the
state of Georgia declined to respond to the claim because it regarded itself
86
as immune from suit by a citizen of another state.1
The Supreme Court, with each Justice writing a separate opinion, held
that Article I indeed subjected the state to suit for payment of its debts to
a resident of another state. 87 All agreed except Justice Iredell. 8 8 Since no
argument had been presented by the state of Georgia, the opinions of the
other Justices largely responded to Iredell's reasoning.
Justice James Iredell, who had attended the North Carolina ratification
convention as a supporter of the proposed Constitution, began his opinion
with an interesting aside. He argued that criminal actions are beyond the
scope of federal jurisdiction granted by Article III since they are not
considered "controversies," the term used respecting actions between a
state and a citizen of another state. 189 Iredell's interpretation of the
constitutional text placed special significance on the sequence of the nouns
in Article III's grant of state-citizen diversity jurisdiction. According to his
interpretation, Article II permits a state to sue a non-citizen in federal
court, but Iredell concluded that this jurisdiction extends only to "controversies," or civil cases. 9 ' Because the most common suit by a state against a
non-citizen would be a criminal proceeding, but for Iredell's interpretation
of "controversies," the door would be left open for Congress to allow such
"82 William F. Swindler, Mr. Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment, in
YEARBOOK OF THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY (1981),
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04_-library/subsvolumes/04_c03_d.html.
183 Id.

'8 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 430-31 (Iredell, J., dissenting). For constitutional jurisdiction, the plaintiff invoked Article III, § 2, para. 2 of the Constitution
(state-citizen diversity). Id.
185 Swindler, supra note 182.
16 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 469 (Jay, C.J.).
7
81
Id. at 479 (Jay, C.J.).
88
Ild. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
9
ld. at 431-32 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 2).

190Id.
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actions to be removed from state to federal court, a result that would be a
far greater affront to state authority than the assumpsit action at issue.

Although they had much to say in refutation of Iredell's basic thesis, none
of his brethren took issue with his remarks concerning state criminal
actions.' 9'
Second, Iredell concluded that while a state may pursue a civil action
against a diverse citizen in federal court, the inverse does not hold.
Consistent with the previously suggested reading of Hamilton's The
FederalistNo. 81, Iredell concluded that there can be no suit in a federal
court unless authorized by Congress, and that Congress had not adopted a
law allowing a citizen to bring an assumpsit action against a state.' 92 He
went further, however, and rejected the contention that Congress could
authorize such a right of action, explaining:
Every State in the Union in every instance where its sovereignty has not
been delegated to the United States, I consider to be as compleatly
sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the powers surrendered.
The United States are sovereign as to all the powers of Government
actually surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the
powers reserved. It must necessarily be so, because the United States have
no claim to any authority but such as the States have surrendered to
93

them.'

Finally, Justice Iredell, in a long discourse guided by English treatises and
decisions, explained that in most instances courts do not entertain suits to
recover money owed by the Crown.' 94

Justice John Blair, who had been a Virginia delegate at the Constitutional Convention, dismissed the assertion that a state could have sovereign
immunity from suit. Rather, he reasoned that a state "by adopting the
Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United
States, she has, in that respect, given up her right of sovereignty.' ' 95
Justice James Wilson, one of the most active participants in the debates
at the Constitutional Convention, and a member of the Committee of Detail

'9'See id. at 450-53 (Blair, J.); id. at 453-55 (Wilson, J.); id. at 465-69
(Cushing,
J.); id. at 469-79 (Jay, C.J.).
'92Id.at 432 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (arguing that federal jurisdiction is "one of
those cases... inwhich an article of the Constitution cannot be effectuated without
the intervention of legislative authority").
193
Id.
94

1 Id.

'9

at 445 (Iredell, J., dissenting).

Id. at 452 (Blair, J.).
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that had played a major role in drafting the Constitution, politely and
indirectly chided his close friend, Justice Iredell, by recounting philosophical critiques of those who are so wedded to traditional notions that their
minds are too inflexible to recognize and accept superior concepts that have
superseded those rules.' 96 Wilson rejected the claim that a state can
immunize itself from suit by surrounding itself in a cloak of sovereignty.
In language that rang with the indignation of a signer of the Declaration of
Independence, he asserted:
To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is totally
unknown. There is but one place where it could have been used with
propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported
with the delicacy of those, who ordained and established that Constitution. They might have announced themselves "SOVEREIGN" people of
the United States: But serenely
conscious of the fact, they avoided the
97
ostentatious declaration. 1
Justice Wilson declared that Georgia was not a "sovereign" because it is the
people of Georgia who are sovereign: "[A]nother principle ...forms, in
my judgment, the basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived
from the pure source of equality and justice must be founded on the
CONSENT of those, whose obedience they require. The Sovereign, when
traced to his source, must be found in the man."' 98 Justice Wilson then
defended the merits of his conclusion by surveying the history of the
concept of sovereignty, the political and legal principles underlying the
adoption of the Constitution, the text, and the process of ratification. 99
Justice William Cushing, who had been vice chair of the Massachusetts
convention that ratified the Constitution, offered a more concise and less
developed opinion, which largely parsed the constitutional text. He, too,
concluded that the suit filed in the Supreme Court against Georgia was
proper under the Constitution. 00
Chief Justice John Jay's opinion was the last in the sequence. Jay was
the author of five of The FederalistPapers,which played an important role
in persuading New York voters to support ratification. Jay used the same
fundamental premise as Wilson in voting to allow the action against
Georgia. Describing the legal effect of the revolution, he stated:
See id. at 454 (Wilson, J.).
J.).
'98 Id. at 458 (Wilson, J.).
id. at 458-66 (Wilson, J.).
2'99 See
Id.
at 466-69 (Cushing, J.).
196

197Id. (Wilson,
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From the crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed
to the people of it; and it was then not an uncommon opinion, that the
unappropriated lands, which belonged to that crown, passed not to the
people of the Colony or States within whose limits they were situated, but
to the whole people; ... the people nevertheless continued to consider
themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and they continued
without interruption to manage their national concerns accordingly .... 201
Jay next observed that European and British notions of sovereignty were
based on a feudal society in which the prince is sovereign and the people
are subjects of that central authority. He declared, however, that "no such
ideas obtain here. '212 The Chief Justice then asked whether "suability is
compatible with State sovereignty. 2 °3 In answer to that question he
observed that since a citizen obviously can sue another citizen or a group
of citizens or a corporation formed by citizens, and since all the citizens of
one state sue all of another when one state sues another state, and since a
state can sue an individual citizen, there is no good reason that a citizen
should not be able to sue the entire citizenry of a state in that community's
collective capacity. Jay argued that this view reflected the plain meaning
of Article III, Section 2, as well as promoting the Preamble's promise of
establishing justice. He argued that the Preamble's goals include providing
justice for the few against the many as well as the many against the few. 2°
Jay reserved the question of whether the Constitution's rejection of
sovereign immunity applied to debts incurred prior to the adoption of the
Constitution.2 °5
Returning to the main thesis, we find that, although in a variety of ways
all of the Justices had participated in the promulgation or adoption of the
Constitution, most of the opinions went beyond that text to discern its
201 Id. at 470 (Jay, C.J.).
202 Id.

at 471 (Jay, C.J.).

203 Id. at 472 (Jay, C.J.).
204Id. at 472-79

(Jay, C.J.). The Chief Justice also briefly considered whether
the federal government is immune from suit. Observing that the question was not
before the Court, he noted a possible reason to distinguish the necessity of granting
federal immunity from suit. Although the federal Executive can execute judgments
against a defendant state, there is no power the Court can call upon to enforce a
judgment against the United States. Id. at 478. Hence, Jay indicated it might be
appropriate for the Court, perhaps as a matter ofjudicial discretion in controlling
its docket, to treat the federal government as immune from suit in order to avoid
rendering
unenforceable judgments. Id.
205 Id. at 479 (Jay, C.J.).
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meaning under the circumstances of the case. In assessing the value of
guidelines for interpreting the text, one should remember that The
Federalist Papers may not always provide relevant evidence of the
framers' and ratifiers' intent, since five of the states ratified the Constitution before the Papers were published.0 6 Similarly, to the extent they are
available, the statements at the ratifying conventions were not published
until decades later. 20 7 Nonetheless, the more probing judicial opinions
examined and assessed the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the
competing contentions by weighing particular doctrines of common law
and political theory, the lessons of history, and the jurists' own perceptions
of the effect their decision would have in carrying out the Constitution's
stated purposes.
The Chisholm decision provoked considerable political consternation.
Some expressed indignation that those who supported the British could
now collect their debts from the taxes paid by those who fought the
Revolution 208-- a view that overlooked the Chief Justice's final observation
respecting the possible justification for allowing immunity from suits on
debts that preceded adoption of the Constitution. 0 9 Others may have been
offended by the image of federal judges, including Supreme Court Justices,
who were not residents of the state, interpreting instruments involving state
government undertakings and deciding questions of state substantive law,
or even trying the facts, in disputes concerning seemingly local affairs. 1 °
Still another likely concern was that, at least with respect to non-citizens,
a state might no longer be able to create a cause of action under which it
could not itself be liable. t '
206 Joan

Meyler, A Matter ofMisinterpretation,State Sovereign Immunity, and
Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence,45 How. L.J. 77, 86 n.33 (2001) (noting that
the delegates at the Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut
ratifying
conventions would not have seen the Papers).
207 See
James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrityof the
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 & n.75 (1986) (noting that all
information about the ratifying conventions comes from Jonathan Elliot's The
Debatesin the Several State Conventions, first published in four volumes between
1827 and 1830).
208 See Fletcher, supra note 173, at 1058.
209 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 479 (Jay, C.J.).
210 Starting in 1789 and throughout the period in question, the Circuit Courts,
which held two annual sessions in each district, were trial courts that consisted of
two Supreme Court Justices and a district court judge. ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD
STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS 15 (2d ed. 1991).
21' Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 268 (1985) (noting that
James Madison and John Marshall found it "irrational" to suppose that a sovereign
could be haled into court for a breach of its own law).
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At one extreme, in response to Chisholm the Georgia House adopted
a bill condemning to hanging anyone in that state who might attempt to
levy a judgment against the state.21 2 Massachusetts took a less extreme
position by adopting a resolution calling for an amendment to "remove any
Clause or Article... which can be construed to imply or justify a decision
that a State is compelled to answer in any suit by an individual or individuals in any Court of the United States. '21 3 It is not clear whether this "any
Court" reference was intended to include state courts. What is clear,
though, is that the Massachusetts call did not explicitly reject the Supreme
Court's pronouncement that a state does not have sovereign immunity
against being sued.
The political climate in which this reaction took place was complicated
by continuing tensions between the United States and Britain over their
mutual accusations of non-compliance with the Jay Treaty.1 4 British troops
remained in the Northwest Territory and justified their continued presence
by arguing that, in violation of the peace treaty, American states as well as
individuals were not paying debts owed British subjects.21 5 At the same
time, hostilities grew between France and Britain, and each sought support
from the United States. President Washington was determined to maintain
neutrality but feared that Britain would not respect American neutrality so
long as America was not adhering to its treaty obligation to enforce claims
owed British subjects.216 Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, generally were
sympathetic to France, with the result that states and localities resisted
paying debts owed the British for reasons of both ideology and financial
stress. In order to strengthen their ability to resist such claims, some in the
Anti-Federalist camp were calling for a new convention to amend the
Constitution.2 7
A proposal to overrule Chisholm by constitutional amendment came
shortly after it was decided. The initial proposed wording is reported to
have provided that no state could be liable in a suit by any person in
"judicial courts, established, or which shall be established under the
authority of the United States."2 8 Congress recessed; when it resumed in
212

Fletcher, supra note 173, at 1058.

213 Id.

See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1902 (1983).
214
215

216

See id. at 1914.
See id. at 1928-29 (describing Washington's decision to take a neutral stand

for fear
that war with the British would erupt).
217
Id. at 1931-32.
218 Fletcher, supra note 173, at 1058-59. The next day, a second proposed

amendment was submitted to the House. Id.
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January of 1794, the present wording was introduced for what became the
Eleventh Amendment." 9 There is little known documentation showing what
the drafters discussed or intended. What is clear is that the Federalists, who
still controlled Congress, wanted to quiet the political tension being
generated over Chisholmby passing an amendment that narrowly overruled
the case.220 At the same time, the Federalists wanted to retain the power to
placate the British, and thus persuade them to leave the territories, through
assurances that courts would enforce the Jay Treaty. 2 Whatever was on
the minds of those who drafted and adopted the resulting constitutional
change, a year after Chisholm was decided, Congress passed the Eleventh
Amendment, which received the necessary state ratification injust over one
year.

22 2

Although in Chisholm the Court had denied that a state had immunity
from suit, the Eleventh Amendment said nothing about sovereign immunity.
Rather, it addressed only the narrow diversity jurisdictional question
decided in Chisholm by specifying who can sue in federal court. 223 The text
of the Eleventh Amendment offers two possible readings respecting its
effect on the jurisdiction of federal courts. The more literal reading
removes from federal courts all authority to entertain a suit of any sort
brought against a state by a citizen of another state or a citizen of another
nation. This more literal reading, however, does not bar a person in that
category from suing a state in its own court based on a federal right, such
as the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts, or a
right, privilege or responsibility enacted by Congress. 24 In such a suit, the
state court is bound, under the Supremacy Clause, to enforce that federal
right as the supreme law of the land, and any assertion of state immunity
should yield to the superior federal right.225 Chisholm explained with clarity
and extensive justification why a state court must enforce federal law in a
suit by a person against the state; that duty is not contradicted by anything
in the text of the Eleventh Amendment. On its face, therefore, the Eleventh
Amendment does nothing more than require non-citizens to go to the state
Gibbons, supra note 214, at 1932.
1934.
221 Id. at 1935.
222 See id. at 1934-35; Fletcher, supra note 173, at 1059.
223 U.S. CONST. amend. XI: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State."
224 Gibbons, supra note 214, at 1928.
221 See id. at 1935.
219

22 0

1 d. at
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court to obtain a judgment for debts owed by the state. Commentators have
noted that this interpretation is consistent with carrying out the political
objectives of the Federalists who controlled Congress when the amendment
was adopted.226 As so construed, the amendment quieted state indignation
over the implicit affront of not trusting such suits to the states' courts,
while at the same time enabling the Secretary of State to give the British
assurances that treaty obligations continued to be enforceable.
In order to understand the alternative reading of the Eleventh Amendment's text, it is helpful first to review the structure and language of the
jurisdictional provisions of Article III and the effect Chisholm had on the
interpretation of those provisions. Article I creates two types of federal
court jurisdiction: a)jurisdiction based on the identity of one or both parties
to a dispute; and b) jurisdiction based on the subject matter of a suit
involving a federal substantive claim. Although Chisholm's suit involved
a federal substantive claim-a potential violation of the Contracts Clause
of Article I, Section 102 2 7-- the Court did not discuss that potential basis for
jurisdiction.
Moreover, this subject matter alone would not have qualified the action
to be tried under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Rather, the
decision allowed the suit to be initiated in the U.S. Supreme Court for two
reasons. First, the identity of the parties-a state and a citizen of another
state-complied with one of the parties-based categories ofjurisdiction in
Article Ill, Section 2, Paragraph 1. Second, the fact that a state was a party
further qualified the suit to be initiated as an original matter in the Supreme
Court under Article IU, Section 2, Paragraph 2.228 Inasmuch as the Eleventh
Amendment was intended to reverse Chisholm, and inasmuch as it is silent
respecting Chisholm's explicit holding that sovereign immunity did not bar
the federal court from exercising jurisdiction, a reasonable reading of the
amendment is that its only purpose was to delete from Article III, Section
2, Paragraph 1 the language giving federal courts jurisdiction based on
state-citizen diversity. 9 Under this alternative reading, however, Chisholm

generally id. at 1931-39.
227 "No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
226 See

impairing the Obligation of Contracts... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
228 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431 (1793).
229 This view is advocated by Justices Stevens and Brennan. Dissenting in Kimel
v. FloridaBoard of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), Justice Stevens argued, "[T]he
Amendment only places a textual limitation on the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts." Id. at 97 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
286-89 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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could still have sued in the Supreme Court230 based on the constitutional
claim as a separate basis for jurisdiction.
This alternative interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment draws
support not only from the history of its purpose, but also from the wording
of the amendment and Article I1. The federal judiciary is granted three
forms of subject-matter jurisdiction under Article II: cases in law and
equity; cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
" ' If the
States; and cases in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.23
phrase
"suit in law or equity" used in the Eleventh Amendment is given its
traditional meaning, it encompasses only judicially promulgated rules of
law and equity. Thus, under this reading, the Eleventh Amendment is
inapplicable to cases involving constitutional, federal statutory, treaty,
admiralty, or maritime claims, and federal courts retain jurisdiction over
diversity suits against states in these subject-matter categories.232 Moreover,
because the amendment provides that the "Judicial power.., shall not be
construed to extend" to suits brought by a non-citizen against a state, the
text can be interpreted as permitting the federal legislature to provide for
suits based on federal subject matter jurisdiction relating to constitutional,
federal statutory, treaty, admiralty, or maritime claims.
Soon after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the Attorney
General of the United States petitioned the Supreme Court, in
Hollingsworthv. Virginia,to decide whether the Eleventh Amendment did
or did not "supersede all suits depending, as well as prevent the institution
of new suits, against any one of the United States, by citizens of another
' The status
state."233
of the petition is perplexing, since Virginia had not
230 The suit, alternatively, could have been brought in the federal circuit court.
See supra note 210.
231 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 1.
232 The Court eventually ruled that the federal judiciary lacks authority to create
or enforce general common-law rules except when acting under such specific
delegations of authority as is the case respecting its admiralty and maritime

jurisdiction. However, this principle had not been announced at the time the
Eleventh Amendment was adopted. See generally United States v. Hudson &

Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (holding that the federal courts do not have
jurisdiction to enforce criminal common law); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins 64
(1938) (holding that there is no general federal common law). From 1809 to 1921
the Supreme Court declined to include admiralty claims within the scope of the
Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional ban. See Fletcher, supra note 173, at
1078-83.
233 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 378 (1798).
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made an appearance in the suit.234 Therefore, at most, the Attorney General
participated in an amicus curiae capacity. If the Attorney General was not
a party, he should have lacked standing to raise any question respecting the
status of this suit. Moreover, the question he raised extended to other
pending actions, which likely included some in which he had not yet made
an appearance in any capacity. More importantly, it was not clear whether
the petition was addressing only suits claiming federal jurisdiction based
on the identity of the parties, or whether it was also addressing those based
on subject-matter jurisdiction. The case report's summary of the arguments
does not clarify this.
The claimant in Hollingsworth relied on two grounds to assert that the
Eleventh Amendment could not possibly stand in the way of his suit. First,
he contended that because the constitutional amendment had not been
presented to the President for his signature, the procedure of its adoption
was deficient and, thus, the amendment was a nullity.235 Additionally, he
maintained that since his case had been filed before the amendment's
adoption, it could not ex post facto eliminate the Court's jurisdiction.236
The day after arguments were made, the Court, without explanation,
announced that "the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could
not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a
state was sued by the citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of
' The Court's very pronouncement was in the form of
any foreign state."237
an advisory opinion, and Chief Justice John Jay, who had since left the
Court, had held such pronouncements to be beyond the Court's authority.23
Later decisions confirmed advisory opinions to be outside the Court's
powers.239 More importantly, the holding lacked any supporting explanation

of its scope of reasoning.
About a quarter-century later, the Court considered a case in which a
Virginia court convicted two non-Virginian defendants of violating state
law by selling in Virginia a lottery ticket issued by the City of Washington,
which was within the federal enclave of the District of Columbia.240 The
234 Id.
at

380.

235 Id. at

379.
Id. This claim relied on Article I, § 10, cl. 1 of the Constitution, which
prohibits
the state from making ex post facto laws.
237
236

Id.
at 382.
supra note 11, at 328; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at
64-65.
239
238 1 TRIBE,

240

See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 265-66 (1821).
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defendants appealed to the Supreme Court on the premise that their conduct
was authorized by a federal law.2 41 The state resisted Supreme Court review
on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment removed from the Supreme
Court jurisdiction to review the case, since the controversy was between a
state and a non-citizen of that state.242 Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for
the Court, asserted that the Eleventh Amendment had been adopted solely
to quiet apprehension that debts owed by the states might be enforced in the
federal courts. 43 Marshall did not, however, offer any documentary support
for this conclusion or discuss what other concerns had been expressed by
those who drafted, adopted, and ratified the amendment. He did, though,
delineate the difference between the federal judiciary's subject-matter
jurisdiction and its jurisdiction based on the character of the parties, and
emphasized that subject-matterjurisdiction applies without exception to all
such cases including those in which a state is a party. The Chief Justice's
discourse avoided explicitly examining the Eleventh Amendment's effect
on Chisholm's rejection of the sovereign immunity principle. It was
unnecessary for him to explore that question, however, because the
attributed purpose of safeguarding state treasuries justified the Court's
conclusion that only cases in which the state is a defendant (here the state
was the plaintiff) are covered by the amendment. 2 " Moreover, appellate
review by means of a writ of error, the basis on which the case was in a
federal court, was found not to be a suit against a state.245
Marshall's discussion in a later case, Sundry African Slaves v.
Madrazo, suggests that he may have been prepared to exclude from the
Eleventh Amendment's preclusion of federal jurisdiction those cases
against a state that raise a federal substantive claim for relief or a claim
brought in admiralty.246 In Sundry African Slaves, a Spanish slave trading
ship's cargo was seized pursuant to an 1807 federal law expropriating slave
cargoes, and custody of the slaves was transferred to the state of Georgia,
where the seizure occurred. In accordance with the 1807 federal statute,
Georgia sold most of the slaves, kept the proceeds, and retained custody of
the remaining slaves. The slave trader brought an admiralty action against
the Governor of Georgia, seeking restitution of slaves taken from his ship
and the payment to him of the proceeds from the state's sale of other slaves

241 Id. at
242

269.

Id. at 315.
243Id. at 406-07.
244 See id. at
2451 d. at
246

405-12.
412.
Sundry African Slaves v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828).
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who had been removed from the vessel.247 Writing for the Court, Justice
Marshall first determined that the suit was based on actions of the Governor
that conformed with state law. 248 Next, Marshall observed that the
Governor had done nothing in violation of federal law. Although Marshall
did not spell out the significance of that fact, his observation raised the
implication that the possibility of federal subject-matter jurisdiction was
not present.249 That implication takes on new significance when one
considers that the Court must have weighed the federal issue-whether the
taking comported with federal law-in order to conclude that the Governor
had not violated that statute. That is, the Court must have exercised
jurisdiction over the claim against the state in order to make this finding.
The Chief Justice next observed: "The decree cannot be sustained as
against the state, because, if the 11th amendment to the Constitution, does
not extend to proceedings in admiralty, it was a case for the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court."25 That is, there was a procedural defect
in bringing the federal admiralty claim. The Court, therefore, explicitly did
not reach the issue of whether federal subject-matter jurisdiction based on
admiralty was beyond the jurisdictional barrier created by the Eleventh
Amendment. Nevertheless, as observed above, the Court implicitly had
exercised its subject-matter jurisdiction with respect to the question of
whether the federal statute had been violated.
In the meantime, in another case, the Court had narrowed the Eleventh
Amendment's grant of state immunity when it held that a state's merely
having an interest in the outcome of an action does not bring the case
within the Eleventh Amendment.2 1' Thus, a non-citizen could bring a suit
in federal court against a bank chartered by a state even though the state
was part owner of the bank.252
C. Post-Civil War Understandingsof the Eleventh Amendment
The text of the Eleventh Amendment left more questions unanswered
than answered. The Justices who lived through the process of the amend241
Id. at
24 8Id.
at

118-20.
123.
249 Another substantive federal issue would have been present had Madrazo
asserted that the expropriation was a federally authorized taking of property
without just compensation and, therefore, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The
Court's
opinion, however, does not reveal the theory of Madrazo's claim.
250 Sundry
African Slaves, 26 U.S. at 124.
25 Bank of the United States v. Planters Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904
(1824).
25 2

Id. at 907.
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ment's adoption never, in their opinions concerning Eleventh Amendment
questions, resolved the ultimate question of what changes the amendment
was intended to effect. Clearly, the amendment represented an adjustment
of the balance between federal and state authority. A little over six decades
later, however, whatever adjustment the amendment had achieved was
overshadowed by the outcome of the Civil War and the resulting constitutional amendments, particularly the Privileges and Immunities, Due
Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 3 In
the aftermath of a war fought over claims of state sovereignty, those
Clauses provided new bases for Congress to allow states to be sued.
The Supreme Court has never questioned that the Civil War Amendments modified the Eleventh Amendment, because they were adopted more
recently. Nor has the Court questioned that federal laws adopted pursuant
to those amendments can provide enforceable individual claims for relief
against a state. 25 4 Accordingly, it has been persuasively argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection from state interference with federally
granted privileges and immunities should ensure that states not interfere
with remedies granted by constitutionally valid federal laws, whether these
255
laws are enforced in state or in federal courts.
Nevertheless, the Court's decisions in the latter part of the nineteenth
century extended rather than reduced the Eleventh Amendment's restrictions on suits against states. In Louisiana v. Jumel, over the dissents of
Justices Field and Harlan, the Court dismissed a suit in equity brought by
claimants of unidentified citizenship, who had asked the Court to require
state officers to enforce the state's obligation to pay state bondholders the

253

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
254 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); see also
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 316 (1819).
255 William J. Rich, Privilegesand Immunities: The MissingLink in Establishing CongressionalPower to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 28
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235 (2001). Federal privileges and immunities can be
asserted only by U.S. citizens. Nevertheless, unless there is a compelling
justification for a state's exclusion of non-citizens from a federally granted benefit,
equal protection would appear to require that legal aliens receive the same
treatment. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,376 (1971); Sugarmian v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973).
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interest due on state bonds.256 Without examining the text of the Eleventh
Amendment or the impact of the Supremacy Clause or the Fourteenth
Amendment upon the federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and
without reference to any source of constitutional guidance, the Court, citing
a decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court, held for the state: "[T]here is
no way in which the state, in its capacity as an organized political
community, can be brought before any court of the State, or of the United
States, to answer a suit in the name of these holders to obtain such a
judgment.

257

The Louisiana decision cited by the majority in Jumel addressed only
the issue of whether under Louisiana law a court of that state could
entertain a suit that in essence was against the state. The Supreme Court
offered neither analysis respecting the soundness of that decision, nor any
explanation of the decision's relevance to the Eleventh Amendment issue.
Instead, the bulk of the Court's opinion addressed the question of whether
this suit was against individual state officers to prevent their commission
of unconstitutional conduct, which arguably would have been a means of
avoiding the claimed Eleventh Amendment defense,258 or in reality was an
effort to require the state itself to pay the money owed. Comparing various
British and American suits involving the enforcement of bonds, the Court
concluded that in fact this action was of the latter type.2 5 9

In contrast, Justice Field, dissenting, analyzed the subject-matter
jurisdiction issue based on the constitutional text and prior applications of
the supremacy doctrine. Field explained that whenever a state legislature
impairs the performance of its contractual obligations, its conduct is a
nullity because the federal Constitution is supreme.26 ° Justice Harlan, also
dissenting, asserted that British decisions respecting whether sovereign
immunity can bar a court from requiring a government to pay its debts did
256 Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 716-17, 727-28 (1883).
257 Id. at 720 (citing

State ex rel. Hart v. Burke, 33 La. Ann. 498 (1881)).

258

Jumel, 107 U.S. at 720-21. The proposition had the support of the Court's

decision in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 868
(1824). In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Court accepted this method

of evading the Eleventh Amendment immunity claim. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 665 (1974), however, the majority held that an Ex parte Young action
cannot be used to obtain a retroactive monetary remedy from a state. In Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), the majority indicated that such an
action cannot be brought by individuals to obtain any form of relief if it is the
state's
own legislative policies that are challenged by the suit. Id. at 269.
259 Jumel, 107 U.S. at 728.
260 Id.
at 733 (Field, J., dissenting).
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not support the majority's conclusion.26' More importantly, Harlan
observed that the claim of state sovereign immunity is inconsistent with the
American constitutional structure, in which the only supreme power is the
law. Quoting from an earlier decision of the Court, he stated: "All the
officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of
the law and are bound to obey it. ' 262 According to Harlan, the Supremacy
Clause is not modified by the Eleventh Amendment; the Clause dictates
that the constitutional duty not to impair contractual obligations prevails
over any sovereign immunity claim by a state.
A few years later, in Hagood v. Southern, the Court ruled that Jumel
barred a suit in federal court to enforce payment on a scrip the state had
issued as a guarantor of the payment of a failed railroad's bond.263 Once
again, however, the Court offered no explanation for the conclusion it had
reached in Jumel. The Court's failure in Jumel to provide any meaningful
supporting analysis, whether based on text, history, or other sources, was
certainly consistent with its generally cursory, callous, and inaccurate
treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment during the last three decades of the
nineteenth century. 2 " It made some effort at meaningful legal analysis and
exposition in 1890, however, when it decided Hans v. Louisiana.6 5
Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, alleged that in violation of Article I, Section
10 of the U.S. Constitution, Louisiana had failed to pay interest due on the
state-issued bonds Hans held.2 66 The federal trial court had dismissed Hans'
suit based on the state's assertion of sovereign immunity. That decision was
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which invoked Jumel and two
subsequent similar decisions to conclude that the Eleventh Amendment did
not permit federal courts to take subject-matter jurisdiction over an
individual's suit against a state.2 67
Although the Court used Hansas an opportunity to provide the missing
analysis to support its Jumel ruling, its rationale in Hans primarily
explained why, when the Eleventh Amendment's text speaks only about
suits brought against a state by non-citizens, an action could not be
Id. at 755-56 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
756 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 220 (1882)).
263 Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 67, 70 (1886).
264 See, for example, its disposition of the Fourteenth Amendment arguments
in The Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) and The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
265 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
261

2621 d.at

266Id.at
267

Id.

3.

at 10.
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entertained by a federal court even though the plaintiff was a citizen of the
same state. The Court reasoned that it would be unseemly to bar a noncitizen from using federal subject-matter jurisdiction to sue a state in
federal court, but to allow such a suit to a citizen of that state.26 Of course,
the relevance of this proposition was dependent on the soundness of the
still-unanalyzed pronouncement of the Louisiana court, which had been
accepted by the Supreme Court without discussion in Jumel.
After pronouncing this potential "anomalous result,"269 the Court turned
to its examination of the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment by observing
that it was adopted as a result of the "shock" created by the Chisholm
decision. 270 The Court, however, offered no documentation or details
respecting the degree or direction of that "shock. 27' Instead, it simply
recounted the pronouncement in the Hollingsworth case and, without any
examination of the possible alternatives in evaluating the significance of
that decision, asserted that this showed that "the highest authority of this
country was in accord" with the minority in Chisholm.2 72 (Presumably the
"highest authority" reference was to "the people," but possibly it was to the
Court.) The Court then reviewed the historic evidence supporting Justice
Iredell's dissent in Chisholm, including statements by James Madison and
John Marshall at the Virginia ratification convention when they were
attempting to quell the objections of George Mason and Patrick Henry.
Those statements suggested that federal courts would hear a case initiated
by citizens against a state only if the state gave its consent.273
The Court continued its analysis in Hans without concern for the
ambiguities of the ratification debates, the incompleteness of the quotes
ascribed to Madison and Marshall, the later statements of both men, the
difficulty of matching the debate rhetoric with the actual constitutional text,
the effect of the unmodified Supremacy Clause, or--most significantly
-- the dubious relevance of those statements concerning the original
Constitution when the case involved construing the Eleventh Amendment.
Rather, the Court's opinion simply declared, "[T]hese views of those great
268

1Id. at 14-15.
Id.at 10.
270
id.at 11.
27' This unexamined characterization of Chisholm's impact was repeated by
Chief Justice Hughes in Monaco v. Mississippi,292 U.S. 313,325 (1934) (holding
that sovereign immunity bars another nation from suing a state in the U.S. Supreme
Court) and by Justice Powell in PennhurstState Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,465
U.S. 89, 97 (1984).
272 Hans, 134 U.S. at 12.
273 Id. at 14.
269
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advocates and defenders of the constitution were most sensible and just,
and apply equally to the present case as to that then under discussion. 274
Interestingly, after giving such great deference to what in the ratification
debates it found to be Marshall's support for the proposition that a state is
immune from suit by an individual, toward the end of its decision the Court
disregarded as mere dicta Marshall's assertion in Cohens v. Virginia that
the federal judiciary has subject-matter jurisdiction if a suit against a state
is based on the laws or Constitution of the United States.275
Instead of proceeding from first principles manifested in the text of the
Constitution, such as the sovereignty of the people and the goals of
establishing justice and preserving the blessings of liberty, the Hans
opinion pronounced principles drawn from the Court's own prejudices. For
example, it announced "The truth is that the cognizance of suits and actions
unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the
constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States. 276
The opiniori also declared, "The suability of a state, without its consent,
was a thing unknown to the law., 277 These declarations disregarded the
content of Article III, the deliberations at the Constitutional Convention, an
accurate summary of the legal history, and the contrary reasoning offered
in Chisholm by jurists who had participated in drafting that Article.
Moreover, they disregarded the rule of law established by Chisholm, which
was only partially modified by an amendment that speaks exclusively to the
identity of the litigants as the basis for federal court jurisdiction, and says
nothing about state immunity from suit.
Despite the Court's acceptance of the proposition that the Eleventh
Amendment barred federal courts from hearing an individual's federal
claim against a state, it avoided treating that immunity as unassailable. The
Court's opinion in Hans instead suggested that in some instances it may be
possible to avoid the effects of sovereign immunity by seeking to have the
state's actions treated as a nullity because the state acted in violation of
federal law.27
D. Modern Understandingsof the Eleventh Amendment
For over eight decades, the authority of Hans as binding precedent
went largely unquestioned. In Employees of the Department of Public
274

Id. at 14-15.

275Id. at 20.
276Id. at 15.
27 Id. at 16.
27 Id. at 19-20.
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Health and Welfare of Missouri v. Department of Public Health and
Welfare of Missouri,9 however, Justice Brennan's dissent examined in
detail the evolution of the Eleventh Amendment and the relevant case
decisions, and concluded that the framers of the amendment did not intend
28
it to "ensconce the doctrine of sovereign immunity.""
In the case, state
employees sued for overtime pay owed under the Federal Labor Standards
Act. Brennan argued that sovereign immunity is anathema to the doctrinal
premise underlying the Constitution and that, at the very least, the
amendment does not insulate a state from being sued by its own citizens to
enforce a right granted by Congress.2"' That dissent launched a recent, more
penetrating scholarly and judicial examination of the amendment's text and
the principles, sources and analysis that best reveal its meaning.282
Justice Brennan again confronted the issue, this time in even greater
depth and breadth, when he dissented, joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.28 3 He
declared:
[T]he Court's Eleventh Amendment doctrine diverges from text and
history virtually without regard to underlying purposes or genuinely
fundamental interests. In consequence, the Court has put the federal
judiciary in the unseemly position of exempting the States from compli284
ance with laws that bind every other legal actor in our Nation.
Justice Brennan then reviewed the Article Ill ratification debates, including
statements in the news media of the day, as well as in the archived
convention journals; the soundness of the majority opinions in Chisholm;
the drafting, adoption and text of the Eleventh Amendment; and the inept
analysis presented in the Hans decision. He concluded from his extensive
examination that the amendment did nothing more than provide that
"henceforth, a State could not be sued in federal court where the basis of
jurisdiction was that the plaintiff was a citizen of another State or an
alien. ,28 5
279 Employees

of the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Dep't of Pub.

Health
and Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
8
0Id. at 309.
281 Id. at 314.
282 Justice Brennan noted this trend in a subsequent dissent in Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258 (1985).
283 Id. at 247 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
284
Id. at 247-48.
281 Id. at 287.
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Although there has been some change in its personnel, the Court
continues to be split five to four on the question of state sovereign
immunity. For a while, when the issue was raised, the majority was content
to justify its decisions simply by citing the rule in Hans and made no effort
to defend the rationale of that holding. More recently, however, faced with
the dissenters' probing analysis, the majority has turned to sources external
to the text in an effort to justify the proposition that the Constitution
immunizes states from all suits by individuals.
Several decisions involving somewhat different questions signaled the
latest phase of the debate respecting a state's immunity from suit by an
individual. In one, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 2" 6 the Court, in order to avoid a
constitutional question, construed the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 as not being intended to affect a state constitution's mandatory
retirement age for statejudges." 7 Referencing the Tenth Amendment, citing
the Article IV, Section 4 guaranty to the states of a republican form of
government, and quoting earlier decisions, The FederalistPapers,journal
articles, and historical accounts of the framing of the Constitution, Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court spoke of the Constitution's establishment
of "dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government. 2 8
However, her opinion also observed:
The Federal Government holds a decided advantage in this delicate
balance: the Supremacy Clause. As long as it is acting within the powers
granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose its will on the
States.... This is an extraordinary power in a federalist system. It is a
289
power that we must assume Congress does not exercise lightly.
In another decision, Printz v. United States, the Court went a step
further, holding that Congress lacks power to require states to carry out
administrative tasks designed to facilitate enforcement of federal gun
control laws.290 Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of five Justices, spoke
not only of a system of dual sovereignty, but also, quoting from The
FederalistNo. 39, of the states' "residuary and inviolable sovereignty. 2 9'
In support of this characterization, Justice Scalia cited the Constitution's
prohibition against involuntarily reducing or combining a state's
286

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).

2 71Id. at 467.
28 Id. at 457.
289 Id. at 460 (citations

omitted).
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
29 1 1d. at 919.
290 Printz
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territory,292 its recognition of state citizenship,293 the requirement of state
approval of constitutional amendments by a super-majority, 294 the
Guarantee Clause,295 and the limitation of federal authority to powers
delegated by the Constitution. Relying especially on statements in The

FederalistPapers,Justice Scalia concluded that the Constitution does not
authorize Congress to impose affirmative duties on state administrative
personnel.296
Three Justices joined Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Printz, in
which he argued that law enforcement practices at the time the Constitution
was adopted, as well as observations made during the ratification debates,
demonstrate that the framers and ratifiers construed the Supremacy Clause
to mean that "[fjederal law establishes policy for the States just as firmly
as laws enacted by state legislatures ....
,,297
In a separate dissent, Justice
Souter took issue with the majority's reading of particular Federalist
Papersrespecting the role of the states in enforcing federal law.2 98 It is
noteworthy that Justice Souter was one of the five members who had joined
the opinion of the Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the prime prior opinion
relied on by Justice Scalia, and later by Justice Kennedy in Alden,299 in
support of the "dual sovereignty" thesis. In Gregory, however, the
discussion was dicta, and the potential constitutional issue concerned the
state's ability to regulate who may hold judicial office.
The debate respecting state immunity from individual suits was
resumed in earnest in Alden v. Maine,300 a case in which Justice Kennedy
attempted to defend the soundness of the Hans decision. In Alden, state
probation officers sought overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 30' The Court held, five to four, that because the state had not consented
to be sued, sovereign
302 immunity prohibited the claimants from recovering
against the state. With implicit recognition of the obvious inconsistency
292

293

Id. (citing U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3).
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2). Scalia neglected to note that the

Fourteenth Amendment can remove a state's ability to control who can hold that
status.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
294 Printz, 521 U.S.
at 919 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
295 Id. (citing U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 4).
296

Id.at 935.

297Id.
at

948.

29' Id.
at 971-76.
299

300

See infra notes 300-322 and accompanying text.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).

30 Id. at 711-12.
3 2Id.
at

759-60.
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between the text of the Eleventh Amendment and some of the Court's
previous decisions, Justice Kennedy stated: "[S]overeign immunity of the
States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh
Amendment."3 °3 Instead, he asserted, it is "a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the
Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of
their admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States)
except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional
Amendments." 3" This conclusory statement, of course, fails to address the
reasoning of Chisholm that state immunity from individual suit is inconsistent with a Constitution promulgated by the authority of a sovereign people
who have declared the primacy of federal law. Justice Kennedy circuitously
countered the argument that sovereign immunity did not survive the
Supremacy Clause, saying: "When a State asserts its immunity to suit, the
question is not the primacy of federal law but the implementation of the law
in a manner consistent with the constitutional sovereignty of the States."3 °5
This contention falls, of course, if such sovereignty is not inherent in the
nature of a state of the United States. Moreover, it is a matter of"implementation," to use Kennedy's words, for a state's status to dictate where it can
be sued, but it is a matter of "primacy" if the state's status allows it to
dictate whether it can be held accountable for a claim bestowed by the
federal governmental authority.
With respect to the first consideration, whether states are sovereign
powers, Justice Kennedy cites earlier opinions to bolster his view that the
Constitution "specifically recognizes the States as sovereign entities."30 6
One would expect such a statement to be supported by textual references
to the Constitution; Justice Kennedy offers none because there are none to
be offered. The closest he comes is to cite the Tenth Amendment as
preserving state sovereignty.3 °7 Although the term sovereignty was widely
used at the time of the Constitution's framing, the Tenth Amendment says
nothing about that status. The power to legislate over such matters as
regulating commerce is delegated to Congress, and the Constitution makes
its laws supreme.3"' Moreover, the Tenth Amendment reaffirms the ultimate

3 3 Id. at
3

713.

4Id.

30 5

Id. at 732.

3"Id.

(quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,71 n. 15 (1996)).
U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
308 Id. art. I, § 8; id. art. VI, § 2.
307
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sovereignty of the people and Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the
authority to represent the will of the people in matters such as regulating
commerce. Hence, the text of that amendment provides no support for
Justice Kennedy's declaration.
The majority opinion in Alden additionally covers the same ground
relied on by Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm, in effect proclaiming the
sanctity of state sovereign immunity. But that doctrine, at least as applied
to suits in the federal courts, was rejected by the Chisholm decision, and
(by Kennedy's own admission) the face of the amendment adopted in
response to Chisholm does not undo the constitutional responsibility of all
courts to enforce federal law throughout the land.30 9
In an effort to explain why the Eleventh Amendment does not explicitly
preserve state sovereign immunity, Justice Kennedy argued that Congress
decided to "restore the original constitutional design" by addressing "the
specific provisions of the Constitution that had raised concerns during the
ratification debates and formed the basis of the Chisholm decision."3 ' The
Chisholm decision's rejection of sovereign immunity, however, did not turn
on the jurisdictional language of Article III allowing a non-citizen to sue a
state in federal court. Instead, the Court invoked the nature of a state as a
subsidiary unit in a system in which government is beholden to a free,
sovereign people, in which the purpose of uniting the states in a federal
structure includes establishing justice, and in which the people's expression
of law in the federal Constitution is declared supreme.3 ' Moreover, the
Eleventh Amendment's text removes neither Article Ill's language
establishing federal subject-matter jurisdiction nor the Supremacy Clause,
both of which are among the specific provisions that, in Justice Kennedy's
'
words, "formed the basis of the Chisholm decision."312
Justice Kennedy also reiterated the previously recounted protests
against Chisholm."' His account, however, does not take into consideration
the range of concerns voiced in such protests, the continued support from
other quarters calling for protection of the right to redress from the states,
or the national government's pressing need to quiet British challenges
regarding the new nation's ability or willingness to comply with its

3
09 Alden, 527 U.S. at 722-23 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XI) (noting that the
"shall not be construed" language suggests the amendment was intended to
overrule Chisholm, rather than to create new limits on the courts' Article III
powers).
31
0

id.

311 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470-71 (1793) (Jay, C.J.).
312
313

Alden, 527 U.S. at 723.
Id. at 723-24.
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commitments. Accordingly, his depiction of the setting in which the
amendment was adopted fails to appreciate that the amendment was crafted
by a Federalist-dominated Congress, not to provide a victory for the most
extreme Anti-Federalist protesters, but rather to remove the immediate
source of political difficulties while preserving the ability to assure foreign
governments and foreign investors that all debts remained enforceable in
the United States. 4
The Alden majority also sought support in what it refers to as "the
essential principles of federalism and... the special role of the state courts
in the constitutional design."3 5 (There is irony in the Court's use of the
term "federalism" to justify heightened state authority inasmuch as, at the
time of the founding, the champions of states' rights were Anti-Federalists.)
The Court supports this part of its thesis by referring not to any part of the
Constitution revealing the "principles of federalism" or the "special role of
the state courts," but instead to quotes drawn from earlier opinions, almost
all of which were penned by the Justices voting in the Alden majority. In
contrast, if one looks to the text as a starting point, what we find is that,
beginning with the Civil War Amendments, there has been a steady
reduction of the autonomy of the states, a reduction that reflects lessons of
political experience demonstrating that the states, like the federal government, pose dangers to liberty and impair coordinated actions needed both
to combat economic market abuses and to facilitate efforts to secure the
nation from external threats. Thus, in addition to the Civil War Amendments' restrictions on state power, the Sixteenth Amendment allows
Congress to levy income taxes without apportionment among the states, the
Seventeenth Amendment provides for popular election of Senators rather
than appointment by the state legislatures, the Nineteenth Amendment
removes state power to limit the right to vote based on sex, the Twentyfourth Amendment removes the power of states to limit voting to taxpayers,
and the Twenty-sixth Amendment removes the power of states to limit
voting based on age above eighteen.
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in Alden cited colonial charters,
case law, and treatises to demonstrate that when the Constitution was
adopted and in the succeeding decades, sovereign immunity was understood to be exclusively a Crown privilege. He further explained that while
the doctrine of sovereign immunity limited the types of suits available
against the Crown, it did not totally remove them.3" 6 In addition, Justice
Souter reviewed conflicting positions taken by statesmen, state charters,
See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
527 U.S. at 748.
3
Alden,
316
Id. at 765-66.
314
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and state laws on the question of whether the liberated states could assert
sovereign immunity and whether it could be legislatively abrogated. 317 He
concluded: "This dearth of support makes it very implausible for today's
Court to argue that a substantial (let alone a dominant) body of thought at
the time of the framing understood sovereign immunity to be an inherent
right of statehood, adopted or confirmed by the Tenth Amendment. 31 8
Justice Souter also examined the philosophic construct of natural law
that has supported the notion of sovereign immunity as a fundamental
characteristic of lawmaking power, 3' 9 and explained: "[I]f the sovereign is
not the source of the law to be applied, sovereign immunity has no
applicability. '32 ° Alternatively, he suggested that if the source of the
doctrine is not natural law, it must be common law and, if so, such rules can
32
be changed by Congress acting under its legislative authority. 1
Once again, in Alden we witness the full Court resorting to extratextual sources to vindicate their conclusions respecting constitutional
standards. Although the weightiness and persuasiveness of the competing
efforts may differ, it should be clear that assessing the merits of the
decisions should go beyond weighing the competing sources. The sources
themselves are too fragile to dictate the final resolution. Hence, the less the
resulting doctrinal pronouncements are anchored in the constitutional text,
the more apparent it is that Justices are reshaping the Constitution to reflect
their personal political and moral philosophies. It is submitted, in this
respect, that the majority decision in Alden, which was joined by selfanointed originalists or textualists,322 is at least as tarnished by such excess
as any of the other decisions examined in this article.
CONCLUSION

Whenever the Supreme Court pronounces as constitutional doctrine a
rule that draws upon principles and norms found outside the text, there is
danger that the judiciary is usurping its responsibility to interpret and apply

317 Id. at

769-70.
789.
319 Justice Kennedy denied placing any reliance on natural law, insisting that his
position
was based on the understanding of the framers. Id. at 734.
320Id. at 797.
321 Id. at 798.
322 See generally Antonin Scalia,
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System,
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 38-41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Clarence
Thomas, Judging,45 KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996).
318 Id. at
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the law and, instead, is acting as "a bevy of Platonic Guardians"; 32 3 that in
such instances the people's charter has been displaced by dictates from a
judicial oligarchy. Such an abuse of power occurred in the United States in
the first third of the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court struck
down a series of state and federal statutes designed to provide economic
and social justice for impoverished workers and owners of small farms and
businesses.324 Ultimately, the Court adopted an approach of giving great
deference to legislative authorityto balance competing economic and social
interests; as a result, the Court upheld the constitutionality of later social
legislation.325 On the other hand, as is illustrated in some of the previously
discussed cases, recently the Court majority has become more accommodating to legislation that restricts the exercise of individual rights and liberty
and more aggressive in curbing Congress' efforts to require states, as well
as persons, to comply with congressionally determined standards of
fairness.326
In the spirit of those who proclaim that they are preventing the
judiciary from usurping the Constitution, the Rehnquist dissent in Roe, as
well as the positions the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas took
in Atkins, present a challenging proposition. Although Chief Justice
Rehnquist accepts the notion that the Constitution protects fundamental
rights, his constitutional interpretation, in those cases at least, looks to
popularly accepted norms and principles (in a sense, to the common law)
reflected in state legislation, as the source for discovering the identity of
those constitutional rights.
If the dominant history of a society reveals a deep-rooted, consistent,
widely-held respect for individual liberty, perhaps it would be sufficient to
look solely to that society's own legislative actions in defining fundamental
rights. But what society can boast such a track record? The Declaration of
Independence declared the inherent right to liberty and equality, but the
principal author, Thomas Jefferson, was and remained a slave holder and
the Constitution, founded on that Declaration, preserved the institution of
323 In his dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 526-27 (1965),
Justice Black borrowed this phrase from Judge Learned Hand.
324Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (1908) are the paradigm cases of this era. In the first, the Court held
unconstitutional a state law that established a maximum number of work hours for
bakery workers; in the second, it held unconstitutional a federal law that protected
the right of railroad workers to form labor organizations.
325 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
326 See supra Part III.D.
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slavery for close to another century. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, itself a response to widespread societal repression and
government restriction of basic freedoms, including slavery and indentured
servitude, failed for over another century to end apartheid, unequal legal
and social treatment on the basis of ancestry and religion, deprivation of
political rights of women, and much more.327 Clearly, the principles
encompassed in the amendment reflected ideals to strive for, not a norm
that had been achieved. Too often state legislation merely demonstrates the
unwillingness of the populace to protect fundamental rights of the
dispossessed, minorities, cultural subgroups, or those supporting unpopular
ideas. Often, too, in reality legislation results not from the will of the
majority, but from the passion of a single-minded minority dedicated to a
particular cause. Such groups can wield disproportionate influence on
political decisions because their potential financial assistance often is vital
to a successful election campaign, or because their ability to marshal
enough ballot support can provide the margin of electoral victory.
Accordingly, a pattern of statutory rejection of a claimed right is a weak
guidepost for ascertaining whether the claim involves a liberty that society
regards as, or the Constitution protects as, fundamental.
How, then, can a court search for the constitutional principles
subsumed within such grand phrases as "due process of law," "freedom of
speech," and "equal protection," without merely becoming a "bevy of
Platonic Guardians," reflecting the Justices' own prejudices and notions of
propriety? As we can see from Alden and similar decisions, consulting the
historic and philosophical underpinnings of the Constitution's text and a
broad range of norms and principles from extra-textual sources does not
insulate a court from error if it is determined to transform the institution of
the American government to fit its own preferences. On the other hand,
Chief Justice Jay and Justices Wilson and Blair, all active participants in
the deliberations that produced the Constitution, showed the path to a more
disciplined approach in their Chisholm opinions. 32 Sources external to the
text provide a backdrop allowing jurists to explore and weigh the soundness
of alternative interpretations. The conclusions that flow from such an open327 1 HARRY J. CARMAN ET AL.,
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ended approach need not be a product of whim or prejudice, but rather can
reflect the wisdom of disciplined reason drawn from diverse experiences.
To this end, the Justices must test the choices against their duty to fulfill the
goals set forth at the very beginning of the Constitution. American
constitutional decision-making at its best should be a search for meaning
that fosters a system of ordered liberty, justice, and the promotion of the
general welfare-a search for rules that best fulfill the promises of the
Constitution's Preamble.
To illustrate, in the situation posed by Alden, the majority's rule meant
that prison guards employed by the state were not entitled to sue to collect
overtime pay--even though they could collect if the Department of Labor
decided to use its limited resources to bring a suit on their behalf. Yet,
county prison guards and guards employed at prisons operated by private
contractors can sue to collect for overtime. Because it is an instrumentality
of the people's collective authority, a state government should be required
to be more protective, not less protective, of its employees' interests than
is a private employer. Yet, based on its slender case for protecting state
sovereign immunity as a symbol of the survival of "federalism," the Court
majority reached the opposite result. Neither the Eleventh Amendment's
text or history, nor the Constitution's goals of establishing justice and
promoting the general welfare, are served by that result. Rather, the only
apparent interest served by the majority's interpretation is the Justices'
personal philosophical commitment to curbing Congress' full exercise of
its power to regulate activities affecting interstate commerce.

